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CUSTOM IN THE COURTS
Lisa Bernstein
ABSTRACT—This Article presents an empirical study of the trade usage 
cases decided under the Uniform Commercial Code from 1970 to 2007. It 
then draws on the study’s findings to revisit the debate over the desirability 
of the trade usage component of the incorporation strategy—the 
interpretive approach that directs courts to look to course of dealing, course 
of performance, and usage of trade to interpret contracts and fill contractual 
gaps. Although the strategy is generally defended on the grounds that, as 
compared to a more formalistic adjudicative approach, it will reduce 
specification costs without unduly increasing interpretive error costs, the 
study reveals that the empirical assumptions on which this defense is based 
are highly questionable. More specifically, it shows that usages are not 
typically demonstrated through the introduction of the types of “objective 
evidence” that the strategy’s defenders suggest will reduce the risk of 
interpretive error—such as expert witness testimony, industry trade codes, 
or statistical evidence that a particular practice is widely observed. Rather, 
usages are most commonly established solely through the testimony of the 
parties or their employees. Expert testimony is introduced in at most 31.5% 
of the cases, the introduction of trade codes is rare, and there were no cases 
in the study in which the regularity with which a practice was observed was 
demonstrated through statistical evidence rather than the mere assertion of 
a witness.
After presenting the study’s findings, the Article reexamines the core 
justifications for the strategy in light of them. It concludes that because the 
strategy is likely to increase both specification costs and interpretive error 
costs, and has particularly negative effects on contracts between large 
multi-agent firms as well as on the types of outsourcing contracts and 
contracts for innovation that are increasingly important parts of the modem 
economy, it should be abandoned in favor of a more formalist approach to 
contract interpretation, at least in contracts between businesses.
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In t r o d u c t io n
The Uniform Commercial Code (Code) directs courts deciding 
disputes between merchants to look to usages of trade and other 
commercial standards and practices to interpret contracts and fill 
contractual gaps. This so-called incorporation approach1 was the brainchild 
of the Code’s principal drafter, Karl Llewellyn, and was an important 
application of legal realist philosophy to commercial law.2 The
1 The term “incorporation approach” refers to the Code’s incorporation of course of performance, 
course of dealing and usage of trade. This Article focuses solely on the incorporation of trade usage. For 
a discussion of the reasons why it is undesirable to incorporate course of dealing and course of 
performance into commercial contracts, see Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: 
Rethinking the Code’s Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996).
2 See William Twining, Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement (2d ed. 2012) 
(describing the realist jurisprudential bent of the Code, but noting that no realist-style social scientific 
research was done in connection with the Code project). It is, however, important to note that early 
drafts of the Code were more sensitive than the adopted version to the procedural and strategic 
considerations identified in this Article. They contained a provision directing “Merchant Experts on 
Mercantile Facts,” to determine the content of usages relating to a variety of subjects including, but not 
limited to, the conformity or nonconformity of goods, whether a nonconformity was substantial, the 
reasonableness of actions, and other issues within the purview of “special merchants’ knowledge, rather 
than of general knowledge.” See Report and Second Draft: The Revised Uniform Sales Act 
251-54 (1941) [hereinafter REVISED UNIFORM Sales Act], Llewellyn recognized that these
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incorporation approach was both endorsed and expanded in the most recent 
proposed revision of Articles 1 and 2 of the Code.* 3 It is also at the 
jurisprudential heart of many of the most important international 
commercial law statutes,4 including the recently completed Common 
European Sales Law.5
The Code’s incorporation strategy has been in operation in U.S. courts 
for over seventy years and has influenced the development of commercial 
law around the world; yet the justifications for the strategy have always 
been predominantly theoretical. The conceptual model underlying the 
strategy has never been tested or even evaluated against the reality of the 
way that its trade usage component operates in practice. This Article 
presents a detailed study of all of the sales-related trade usage cases 
digested under the Code’s trade usage provision from 1970 to 2007. It then 
draws on the study’s findings to reevaluate the core justification for the 
strategy, namely that as compared to a more formalist (agreement-centric) 
approach to interpretation, incorporation decreases specification costs 
without unduly increasing interpretive error costs.6
Subject to the usual methodological limitations of studies based on 
reported cases, the study reveals that the trade usage component of the 
incorporation strategy works very differently in practice from the way that
determinations were ill-suited to adversarial litigation in front of lay juries, explaining that even “such
question[s] as conformity of textiles to a requirement of merchantability can take three weeks merely to 
prepare for trial,” and there is a “tendency of the seller’s choice [of witnesses] to be the seller’s ‘man ’” 
Id. at 251-52.
3 See James J. White, Good Faith and the Cooperative Antagonist, 54 SMU L. REV. 679, 679 n.l 
(2001) (noting that the invocation of commercial standards that rely on usage of trade for their content 
has been “expanded” in the revised Code).
4 See U n it e d  N a t io n s  Co n v e n t io n  o n  C o n t r a c t s  f o r  t h e  In t e r n a t io n a l  Sa l e  o f  G o o d s , 
Apr. 11, 1980,1489 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 9.
5 See Proposal for a Regulation o f the European Parliament and o f the Council on a Common 
European Sales Law, COM (2011) 635 final (Nov. 10, 2011); see also Lisa Bernstein, An (Un)Common 
Frame o f Reference: An American Perspective on the Jurisprudence o f the CESL, 50 COMMON MKT. L. 
R e v . 169, 169-70 (2013) (observing that the Common European Sales Law’s reliance on trade usage is 
similar to the Code’s and therefore suffers from many of the same flaws).
6 See Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt, In Defense o f the Incorporation Strategy, in THE 
JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL Law 193 (Jody S. Kraus & Steven 
D. Walt eds., 2000); Clayton P. Gillette, Harmony and Stasis in Trade Usages for International Sales, 
39 Va. J. In t ’L L. 707, 707-09 (1999) (“The commercial law literature contains a somewhat traditional
story about the efficient incorporation of trade usage___Commercial parties, unable to specify every
contingency with precision, can reduce transactions costs by incorporating default rules into their 
contracts; total contracting costs are minimized to the extent that those defaults reflect risk allocations 
that most parties would have adopted had they negotiated explicitly about the term,” and suggesting that
“usages of trade . .. provide an alternative source of majoritarian defaults___[that] serve the function
of reducing the costs of contracting.”); see also Steven Shavell, On the Writing and the Interpretation o f 
Contracts, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 289 (2005) (putting forth a specification cost saving justification for 
looking to usage that is based on a stylized model of contracting that does not take into account error 
costs or strategic behavior costs).
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it has long been assumed to work in theory. The study demonstrates that 
interpretive error costs are likely to be higher than theorists assume since 
the types of “objective” evidence of trade usages that incorporation’s 
defenders suggest will minimize the risk of interpretive errors7—such as 
expert witness testimony, trade codes, and statistical evidence—are not 
routinely introduced in sales-related litigation. Rather, in a majority of 
cases, the existence and content of usages was proven solely through the 
testimony or affidavits of the parties and/or their employees, a type of 
testimony that may be either deliberately or subconsciously self-serving.8 
In addition, there was not a single case in which either party introduced any 
data that the alleged usage was regularly observed. The study also suggests, 
though by no means proves, that given the weak evidentiary basis of trade 
usage determinations, the Code’s permissive parol evidence rule, and the 
ways that courts have interpreted the Code’s hierarchy of authority, the 
incorporation strategy is unlikely to reduce—and may even increase— 
specification costs in many transactional contexts.
In light of these and other findings about the incorporation strategy’s 
effect on motions for summary judgment, transactors’ ability to engage in 
litigation-related strategic behavior, and the interaction of the strategy and 
the operational policies and contract administration mechanisms used in 
large multi-agent firms, this Article concludes that significant commercial 
law reform is warranted. More specifically, it suggests that if commercial 
law is to effectively meet the needs of the modem outsourced and highly 
innovation-dependent economy, its background interpretive presumptions 
should be shifted in the more formalist/agreement-centric direction of the 
New York common law, at least in transactions between large business 
entities.
Part I explores the statutory framework and commonly articulated 
evidentiary standards for incorporating trade usages into commercial 
agreements. It also discusses the ways that courts have interpreted and 
applied the Code’s hierarchy of authority to permit usages to largely 
override express terms. Part II presents the study of usage in the courts and 
discusses the limitations of the study’s methodology. Part III draws on the 
study’s findings to reevaluate the claim that the incorporation strategy is 
likely to decrease specification costs without unduly increasing interpretive 
error costs. Part IV explores the desirability of moving the background 
interpretive rules of American commercial law in a more formalist
7 Steven D. Walt, The State o f Debate over the Incorporation Strategy in Contract Law, 38 UCC 
L.J. 255, 274 (2006) (“A finding of a business norm requires some objective evidence: a pattern of 
behavior in the relevant trade.”).
8 Llewellyn himself believed that this type of evidence would be biased. See supra note 2.
67
N O R T H WE S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  LAW REVI E W
direction, at least for business-to-business transactions. It also suggests 
some smaller changes to the Code that would be desirable if, as is likely to 
be the case, wholesale revision of the statute proves politically infeasible. 
The Article concludes by identifying the issues that need to be empirically 
investigated before the desirability of incorporation can be definitively 
assessed from a purely empirical perspective.
I. The Statutory and Doctrinal Framework
Articles 1 and 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code have many 
provisions that, together with their Official Comments, require courts to 
look to usages of trade in deciding contract disputes. A usage is defined as 
“any practice or method of dealing having such regularity of observance in 
a place, vocation or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be 
observed with respect to the transaction in question.”9 Usages are 
considered part of the transactors’ legally enforceable agreement, which the 
Code defines as “the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their 
language or by implication from other circumstances including course of 
dealing or usage of trade or course of performance . . .  .”10 As the Official 
Comments explain, “[Waitings are to be read on the assumption that. .. 
usages of trade were taken for granted when the document was phrased.”* 11
Under the Code, usages are also relevant to: interpreting contract 
terms, filling contractual gaps, determining the reasonable time for the 
taking of an action when the written contract is silent,12 determining if a 
contract or a contract provision is unconscionable,13 defining the contours 
of the actions that can be taken by a party given an option to act at his 
discretion,14 defining the meaning of commercial unit,15 determining when
9 U.C.C. § 1-205(2) (2001).
10 See id  § 1-201(3).
11 Id. § 2-202 cmt. 2.
12 Id. § 2-309 cmt. 1 (noting that the “criteria as to 'reasonable time,”’ depend upon commercial 
standards and that an agreement to a “definite time” may be implied by “usage of trade”).
13 See, e.g., Adcock v. Ramtreat Metal Tech., Inc., 44 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 1026, 1032 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (“A party defending a limitation of liability clause may prove it is 
‘conscionable . . .  if the general commercial setting indicates a prior course of dealing or reasonable 
usage of trade as to the exclusionary clause.’” (quoting M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software 
Corp., 998 P.2d 305, 315 n.12 (Wash. 2000))).
14 See U.C.C. § 2-311 cmt. 1 (noting that it is permissible to leave some “particulars of 
performance,” to be designated by one of the parties as long as the power is “exercise[d in] good 
faith . . .  in accordance with commercial standards .. . and the range of permissible variation is limited 
by what is commercially reasonable,” and explaining that “[t]he ‘agreement’ which permits one party so 
to specify may be found. . .  [in] usage of trade”); see also id. § 2-305 cmt. 3 (noting that when a 
merchant exercises an option to set a price he must do so in good faith which requires “observance of 
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade”).
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it is reasonable to conclude that the tender of non-conforming goods with a 
price adjustment will be acceptable,16 determining the extent to which the 
opportunity to cure can be disclaimed,17 creating18 or excluding implied 
warranties,19 defining conforming tender,20 and fleshing out the contours of 
the implied warranty of merchantability.21 Usages are also relevant to 
discerning the terms of a contract formed under UCC § 2-207(3) and to 
determining which so-called “different” or “additional terms” in a battle-of- 
the-forms situation are included in a contract formed under UCC § 2- 
207(2)(b).22
The Code’s hierarchy of authority nominally gives express terms 
priority over inconsistent usages. It provides that “[t]he express terms of an 
agreement and an applicable . . . usage of trade shall be construed wherever 
reasonable as consistent with each other,” but when “such construction is 
unreasonable express terms control. . .  usage of trade.”23 Under the 
relevant case law, however, courts are inclined to find usages to be 
consistent with even seemingly contradictory express terms as long as the
15 See id. § 2-105(6) (defining a commercial unit as “a unit of goods as by commercial usage is a 
single whole”).
16 See id. § 2-508(2) cmt. 2 (“[RJeasonable grounds to believe,” that non-conforming goods would 
be acceptable with a price adjustment, can be found in “usage of trade”).
17 See id. (noting in connection with the right to cure that “[t]he seller is charged with commercial 
knowledge of any factors in a particular sales situation which require him to comply strictly with his 
obligations.”).
18 See id. § 2-314(3) (providing that “implied warranties may arise from. . . usage of trade”); see 
also id. § 2-314(3) cmt. 12 (the statutory language “is to make explicit that usage of trade . .. can create 
warranties.”)
19 See id. § 2-316(3)(c) (“[A]n implied warranty can also be excluded or modified by .. . usage of 
trade.”).
20 See id. § 1-205 cmts. 4 & 8.
21 See id. § 2-314(2)(a) & cmts. 6 & 9 (providing that to be merchantable goods must “pass without 
objection in the trade,” and observing that the meaning of merchantable may “aris[e] by usage of trade 
or through case law,” and pointing out that in applying the statutory language on “evenness of kind” in 
lots, it should be borne in mind that “precautionary language has been added as a remainder of the 
frequent usages of trade which permit substantial variations”).
22 U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 4 lists examples of clauses that would typically be considered a “material[] 
alteration]” of the contract, and thus be excluded from the contract. These include clauses that restrict 
quantity leeway more than the “usage of the trade,” permits or a clause giving a shorter time for 
complaining of defective tender than is “customary or reasonable.” Id. Similarly, U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 5 
lists examples of clauses that do not cause surprise or hardship, including “credit terms where they are 
within the range of trade practice,” and a clause setting out a time to complain of defective tender that is 
“within customary limijs.” This aspect of the Code’s reliance on usage is difficult to contract around 
unless the parties are sending purchase orders pursuant to a master agreement, or have statements in 
their forms (and usually on their website) stating very clearly that unless their terms are agreed to in all 
their particulars, they are unwilling to go forward with the transaction.
23 See id. § 1-205(4).
69
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W
asserted usage does not “totally negate” the express term.24 As one court 
observed, “In making this determination, it must be borne in mind that to 
be inconsistent the terms must contradict or negate a term of the written 
agreement; and a term which has a lesser effect is deemed to be a 
consistent term.”25 More generally, as another court explained, “The trend 
has been for judges, looking beyond written contract terms to . . . extend 
themselves to reconcile trade usage. . . with seemingly contradictory 
express terms. They have permitted . . . usage of trade to add terms, cut 
down or subtract terms, or lend special meaning to contract language.”26
This approach to interpretation, while seemingly in tension with the 
Code’s stated hierarchy of authority, finds support in jurisprudence of the 
Code as reflected in its Official Comments. The Comments emphatically 
reject the idea that even a seemingly clear contract provision—like “500 
tons”—can have a meaning independent of the commercial context in 
which it is used. They explain that the Code “rejects. . .  the ‘lay- 
dictionary’ . . . reading of a commercial agreement” in favor of an 
interpretive approach that determines “the meaning of the agreement of the 
parties” by looking at “the language used by them and by their action, read 
and interpreted in the light o f commercial practices and other surrounding 
circumstances.'''21
The usage component of the incorporation strategy is not a pure 
default rule. Particular usages can reliably be excluded from consideration
24 See infra Table 1 and accompanying text (setting out the contract provisions and the alleged 
usage-based meanings that courts found to be consistent with one another in the interpretation-related 
Study Group cases that went to trial); infra Table 2 (setting out the contract provisions and alleged 
usage-based meanings that courts implicitly found to be consistent with one another in the Study Group 
cases involving a motion for summary judgment on an interpretation issue).
25 Michael Schiavone & Sons, Inc. v. Securalloy Co., 312 F. Supp. 801, 804 (D. Conn. 1970); see 
also Modine Mfg. Co. v. Ne. Indep. Sch. Dist., 503 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) (same); 
Campbell Farms v. Wald, 578 N.W.2d 96, 100 (N.D. 1998) (“In cases governed by the Uniform 
Commercial Code, the courts have regarded the established practices and usages within a particular 
trade or industry as a more reliable indicator of the true intentions of the parties than the sometimes 
imperfect and often incomplete language of the written contract. The courts have allowed such extrinsic 
evidence to modify the apparent agreement, as seen in the written terms, as long as it does not totally 
negate it.”); Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 1981) (“[T]he 
delineation by thoughtful commentators of the degree of consistency demanded between express terms 
and usage is that a usage should be allowed to modify the apparent agreement, as seen in the written 
terms, as long as it does not totally negate it.”).
26 Am. Mach. & Tool Co. v. Strite-Anderson Mfg. Co., 353 N.W.2d 592, 597 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1984).
27 U.C.C. § 1-205 cmt. 1 (emphasis added); see also id. (“The measure and background for 
interpretation are set by the commercial context, which may explain and supplement even the language 
of a formal or final writing.”); Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3, 11 (4th Cir. 1971) 
(“Indeed, the Code’s official commentators urge that overly simplistic and overly legalistic 
interpretation of a contract should be shunned.”); Roger W. Kirst, Usage o f Trade and Course o f 
Dealing: Subversion o f the UCC Theory, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 81 1, 823-25 (discussing the ways that the 
Code rejects the idea of plain meaning and elevates the search for meaning to a search for intent).
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if they are “carefully negated. ” 28 However, simply including a detailed 
provision covering a subject is insufficient to negate seemingly inconsistent 
usages. In addition, the enforceability and effectiveness of a general clause 
opting out of all trade usages is at best unclear.29 Such a clause might keep 
some usages out; yet it is unlikely that the influence of trade usage on 
contract interpretation can be completely excluded in light of the central 
role usage plays, not only in the Code’s overall jurisprudential approach, 
but also in defining the contours of the non-disclaimable “obligations of 
good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care, ” 30 as well as the merchant’s 
duty of good faith that includes the “observance of reasonable commercial 
standards of fair dealing in the trade.” 31
Despite the central role the concept of trade usage plays in the Code’s 
jurisprudence, the Code does not provide any guidance on how the 
“existence and scope” of usages are to be established. It simply requires 
that a party seeking to introduce usage evidence give the other party
28 U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 2. Quinn, a leading form book, suggests that transactors should include a 
version of the following clause for each usage they wish to exclude: “Specific Trade Usage Excluded. 
This Contract was written with the understanding that the following usage of the trade would not affect 
the content, interpretation, or performance of this Contract and is here expressly excluded. The trade 
usage excluded would normally require: [Describe normal effect.] In substitution, the parties have 
agreed to the following: [Describe alternate procedures or allocation o f rights adopted.]" 1 THOMAS 
M. Quinn, Quinn’s UCC Forms and Practice Form 4, at 1-28 (1987).
29 See 5-1 Lexstat Forms & Procedures Under the UCC H 21.06 (2014) (“The structure of 
Section 2-202 appears to allow the admission o f . . . trade usage evidence, even when a merger clause is 
effective to totally integrate the agreement, indeed, some doubt exists of the ability of the parties to 
exclude parol evidence of a ..  . usage of the trade.” (footnotes omitted)); David V. Snyder, Language 
and Formalities in Commercial Contracts: A Defense o f Custom and Conduct, 54 SMU L. REV. 617, 
635 (2001) (“As custom and conduct are part of the agreement not only by the fiat of the UCC 
definition but also as a practical matter, the parties will have a rough time banishing them generally.”). 
Courts do, however, sometimes mention the absence of a clause opting out of usages as an additional 
justification for giving great weight to usage-related evidence. See, e.g., Columbia Nitrogen, 451 F.2d at 
10-11. In one case, the court found that the Code did not apply, but noted in dicta that if the Code 
applied, it would have enforced a provision in the contract which stated that “[n]o terms, conditions, 
prior course of dealings, course of performance, usage o f trade, understandings, purchase orders, or 
agreement purporting to modify, vary, supplement or explain any provision of this Agreement shall be 
effective unless in writing, signed by representatives of both parties.” Madison Indus., Inc. v. Eastman 
Kodak Co., 581 A.2d 85, 90 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990). In another case, a clause excluding 
usages was included in the written contract, but not mentioned in the court’s opinion. See Leighton 
Indus., Inc. v. Callier Steel Pipe & Tube, Inc., 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 1128, 1137 (N.D. 111. 
1991); Leighton Indus., Inc. & Callier Steel Pipe & Tube, Inc., Contract (on file with author) (denying 
the plaintiff s motion for summary judgment and explaining that “whether usage of trade in the pipe 
industry excluded the implied warranty of merchantability is a genuine issue of material fact,” without 
even mentioning that the contract included both a standard integration clause and a clause stating that 
“no course of prior dealing between the parties and no usage of the trade shall be relevant to supplement 
or explain any term used in this agreement.”) .
30 U.C.C. § 1-102(3). The Code permits transactors to particularize the “standards by which the 
performance of such obligations [of good faith and reasonableness] is to be measured,” subject to the 
constraint that such attempts at particularization must not be “manifestly unreasonable,” a concept that 
is also given content, at least in part, by reference to usages of trade. Id.; see id. § 1-102 cmt. 2.
31 See id. § 2-103(b).
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notice32 and that “[t]he existence and scope o f . . . a usage . . .  be proved as 
facts.”33 The Official Comments provide some elaboration. They reject the 
strict English and common law standards for establishing the existence of a 
custom, create a presumption that commercially accepted usages are 
reasonable, make clear that usages are admissible without a showing that 
the contract language is ambiguous,34 and make the question of whether an 
extant usage has been incorporated a question for the trier of fact.35 The 
comments also note that “[i]n cases of a well established line of usage .. . 
where the precise amount of the variation has not been worked out into a 
single standard, the party relying on the usage is entitled. . .  to the 
minimum variation demonstrated.”36 Courts too have failed to provide 
doctrinal guidance on how usages should be proven, yet they have 
recognized that usage evidence is somewhat unique in that “testimony of 
trade custom is testimony to a conclusion; and though all evidence . . .  is 
inferential to a degree . . .  the chain of inference is longer when the fact 
testified to is the existence of a trade custom than when it is the color of the 
defendant’s hair.”37
The Code and the Comments are silent on the question of who has the 
burden of proving the existence and scope of a usage. The leading Code 
treatise and the case law suggest that the burden of proof—at least in the 
gap filling and interpretation contexts—rests on the party attempting to 
prove the usage exists.38 However, in cases arising under § 2-207(2)(b), the 
party attempting to demonstrate that an additional term is a “material 
alteration” may have the burden of demonstrating that its inclusion is not 
customary in the trade.39
32 Id. § 1-205(6).
33 Id. § 1-205(2).
34 See id. § 2-202 cmt. 1 (“This section definitely rejects .. . [t]he requirement that a condition 
precedent to the admissibility of the type of evidence specified in paragraph (a) is an original 
determination by the court that the language used is ambiguous.”).
35 Id. § 1-205 cmt. 9.
36 Id.
37 W. Indus., Inc. v. Newcor Can. Ltd., 739 F.2d 1198, 1202 (7th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted); 
accord Rich Prods. Corp. v. Kemutec, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 937, 965 (E.D. Wis. 1999), aff’d, 241 F.3d 
915 (7th Cir. 2001) (reiterating the “liberal ‘chain of inference’ accorded to testimony on matters of 
trade usage”).
38 See James J. White & Robert S. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code 146 (6th ed. 2010) 
(“[C]ourts are likely to impose the burden of proof on the party who seeks to benefit from evidence 
o f .. . trade usage.”).
39 Assuming the additional term is not designated as a per se material alteration in the Comments, a 
party who wants to exclude the term bears the burden of proving that it was a “material alteration.” See 
Bayway Ref. Co. v. Oxygenated Mktg. & Trading A.G., 215 F.3d 219 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that the 
party who opposes the inclusion of an additional term found in a confirmatory memorandum has the 
burden of proving that it is a material alteration, and such proof can lie in a demonstration that its 
inclusion is not a usage of trade).
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Drawing on these statutory requirements, incorporation’s defenders 
(incorporationists) have developed a fairly well-articulated view of the type 
and quantum of “objective” evidence that they assume will be submitted to 
establish the existence, scope, and content of a usage. They maintain that 
“[ujndcr Article 2, there are two principal methods of demonstrating the 
existence of an observable regularity of conduct,” namely “expert 
testimony and evidence about statistical regularities.”40 They surmise that 
“much of the evidence o f commercial nonns might consist simply in the 
presentation of evidence of statistical norms— mere frequencies of a given 
behavior in the trade.”41 The leading Code treatise takes the position that 
“[t]o prove [a usage of trade], a party must usually call on an expert.”42 A 
leading practice manual presumes the same.43
Despite their legal realist roots, incorporationists have never explored 
the types of trade usage issues that arise in litigation or ways that trade 
usages are actually established in court. Instead, they have been content to 
assume that transactors have been taking advantage of the potential 
specification cost savings the strategy might create by leaving contractual 
gaps, ignoring remote contingencies, and including large numbers of vague 
and standard-like clauses, or industry terms of art, in their contracts. They 
have also assumed that transactors prove usages by introducing objective 
evidence and that courts have been following the Code’s hierarchy of 
authority. As a leading Code commentator put it, “Without a thorough 
analysis of a large group of cases, why should we believe that courts are 
systematically ignoring or misapplying these clear and direct 
commands?”44
The next Part takes up the challenge of looking at just such a large 
group of cases. It presents a study of the cases decided between 1970 and 
2007 in which a trade usage argument was raised in an Article 2 sales
40 Kraus & Walt, supra note 6, at 213; Kirst, supra note 27, at 839 (suggesting that “an outside 
standard does exist to help judge the truth of the assertion that the parties intended the usage to control 
the particular dispute: the existence and scope of the usage can be determined from other members of 
the trade”).
41 Kraus & Walt, supra note 6, at 213; see also Clayton P. Gillette, The Law Merchant in the 
Modern Age: Institutional Design and International Usages under the CISG, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 157, 158 
(2004) (“The contextual significance of trade usage requires adjudicators to discover the alleged usage, 
define its scope, and determine its application to the issue at hand.”).
42 White & Summers, supra note 38, at 145; see also E. Allen Farnsworth, Contracts 471 
(4th ed. 2004) (“A party commonly shows a usage by producing expert witnesses who are familiar with 
the activity or place in which the usage is observed.”).
43 See Gregory M. Travalio et al., Nordstrom on Sales & Leases of Goods 244 (2d ed. 
2000) (“[Pjresumably expert testimony will be necessary to establish a trade usage.”).
44 Robert A. Hillman, Comment, More in Defense o f U.C.C. Methodology, 62 La . L. Rev. 1153, 
1157 (2002).
73
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W
dispute. Its goal is to provide data that can be used to begin to evaluate both 
the claim and the theoretical arguments behind the claim that, as compared 
to a more formalist approach to adjudication, the incorporation strategy 
decreases specification costs without creating a large increase in 
interpretive error costs.
II. Usage in the Courts
In an effort to explore how the Code’s trade usage provision operates 
in practice, a data set with information about all Article 2 sale of goods 
cases decided between 1970 and 2007 that are digested in the Uniform 
Commercial Code Case Digest under the relevant sections of the Code’s 
trade usage provision was constructed.45 The cases were coded to identify 
the types of situations where trade usage arguments are made as well as the 
type and amount of usage evidence that was introduced by parties, was 
required to establish the existence of a usage at trial, was needed to 
establish the existence of a usage on a motion for summary judgment, or 
was sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the usage’s 
existence and thereby defeat a motion for summary judgment.
To obtain detailed information about as many of the 173 cases as 
possible,46 a letter was sent to at least one attorney involved in each case.47
45 The cases were drawn from the Uniform Commercial Code Case Digest under paragraph 1205 
“Course of dealing and usage of trade,” omitting 1205.1(6) “As to security interests”; 1205.1(10) “As to 
acceleration”; 1205.1(11) “As to ownership or title”; 1205.1(12) “As to banking practices”; 1205.2(3)— 
(7) “Bank transactions”; 1205.3 “Course of dealing”; 1205.4(l)(b) “Course of dealing”; 1205.4(3)(a) 
“Motor vehicles: Course of dealing”; 1205.4(7)(a)—(c) “Banking”; 1205.4(8)(b) “Clothing and fabric: 
Course o f dealing”; 1205.4(9)(b) “Construction materials: Course o f dealing”; 1205.4(11) “Security 
interests”; 1205.4(12)(b) “Other: Course of dealing”; 1205.5( 1 )(b) “Express terms of agreement control: 
Course of dealing”; 1205.5(l)(d) “Express terms of agreement control: Course of performance”; 
1205.5(3)(b) “Machinery and equipment: Course of dealing”; 1205(4)(a)-(c) “Security agreements”; 
1205(5)(a)—(b) “Banking and lending”; 1205.6(2) “Course of dealing”; 1205.8 “Course of dealing—sale 
o f goods.” 1-204-2-102.8 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE C a s e  D ig e s t  |  1205, at 115-374 (2007). In 
addition, some cases that were included in the relevant sections of the Digest were nonetheless omitted 
because the case did not deal with sales, the case made no mention of usage, or the court, in remanding 
or ruling, simply mentioned usage or the possibility of introducing usage evidence in passing. 
Individual cases dealing with warranty of title were also omitted regardless of where in the Digest they 
appeared.
46 The number o f cases in the Digest seems strikingly small in light of the Code’s pervasive 
reliance on trade usage. The reasons for this are unclear. It might be that trade usage plays only a minor 
role in Article 2 commercial disputes—perhaps because lawyers consulting treatises and form books 
would be told that they cannot prove a usage without an expert witness. Alternatively, the small number 
o f published decisions may be due to the fact that the sorts of cases where usage issues are likely to 
arise are unlikely to result in published opinions. For example, cases that pit one asserted usage against 
another, or cases where one party introduces evidence to prove and the other party introduces evidence 
to disprove the existence of a usage, are unlikely to result in a written state trial court published opinion 
(as these are rare) or an appeal since they turn on factual findings that are unlikely to be reversed on 
appeal. Similarly, denials of summary judgment in state courts are not typically published, so it is 
possible that usages are being used to defeat such motions in numbers the study would not pick up.
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The letter asked for case documents relevant to the trade usage issues. The 
documents obtained were supplemented with case documents downloaded 
from Lexis and Westlaw. Additional information was also obtained from 
court files where this could be done at a cost under $ 150 per case.48
Using these methods of data collection, a significant portion o f the 
trade usage-related litigation record was obtained for sixty-three cases (the 
“detail group”). Another group of forty cases (the “opinion-only group”) 
was coded using information gleaned solely from opinions available on 
Lexis and Westlaw.49 The remaining seventy cases in the Digest were ones 
where the record could not be obtained and the opinion did not discuss the 
types of usage evidence that were introduced. These cases were coded 
separately and used only to determine the type of trade usage issue they 
involved (the “issue-only group”).50
A. Case Characteristics
The cases in the “detail” and “opinion-only” groups [hereinafter the 
“Study Group”] came from a variety of industries. The only notable 
concentration in any one area (36%) dealt with agriculture, defined to 
include farming, animals, seeds, and agricultural chemicals.51
Across the Study Group, 46.6% of the cases were in federal court52 
and 53.4% in state court.53 58.8% of these cases involved trials or appeals 
from a trial judgment, 32.4% involved motions for summary judgment, 
2.9% involved motions to stay or compel arbitration, and the rest involved 
other procedural postures.54
47 There were some cases in which the lawyers could not be located in Martindale-Hubbell, the 
leading directory of lawyers in the United States.
48 The $150 limit was determined by the research budget. There were several cases where the case 
file turned out to be more expensive either because court personnel misestimated the cost, or because 
additional documents relevant to the issue had to be requested.
49 Cases were included in the “opinion-only” group where the opinion made explicit reference to 
the type of usage information introduced. To mle out the possibility that cases in this group 
underreported trade usage evidence, a two-sided Fisher’s exact test was run comparing the frequency 
with which key types of evidence appeared in the “opinion only” and “detail” groups. It found no 
statistically significant differences between them.
50 Data from the “issue-only group” were included in the analysis only to determine whether there 
were any statistically significant differences between the types of cases in this group and the types of 
cases in the “detail” and “opinion only” groups, in terms of the issue to which the usage or alleged 
usage was addressed. No statistically significant differences were identified.
51 Interestingly, 48.6% of the cases relating to contractual interpretation fell into this category.
52 60.4% of the federal court opinions were trial court decisions and 39.6% were appeals.
53 10.9% of the state court opinions were trial court decisions and 89.1 % were appeals.
54 See Figgie lnt’1, Inc. v. Destileria Serralles, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 411 (D.S.C. 1996) (motion for a 
declaratory judgment), aff’d, 190 F.3d 252 (4th Cir. 1999); Bureau Serv. Co. v. King, 721 N.E.2d 159 
(111. App. Ct. 1999); Southland Farms, Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 575 So. 2d 1077 (Ala. 1991) (a 
certified question to the state supreme court).
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The amounts at stake (in 2012 dollars) varied widely: 3% involved 
less than $10,000, 22% involved $10,000-$50,000, 15.3% involved 
$50,000-$ 100,000, and in the remaining 59.7%, over $100,000 was at 
stake.55
Although it was not always possible to tell if the parties’ contracting 
relationship was discrete or repeat, at least 43.7% of the relationships in the 
Study Group cases that raised an interpretation issue were between parties 
who had done business with one another before.
B. The Types o f Issues that Arose
The study sought to identify the types of issues usages were 
introduced to address. Its findings are set out in Figure 1 below.56
Figure 1: Most Common U sage-Related Issues
Across the interpretation cases, the study also sought to identify the 
subject matter of the usage-related issue. Its findings are set out in Figure 2 
below, which shows that almost all of the usage-related interpretation cases
55 The amounts at stake (the percentages) discussed in the text were calculated on the basis of the 
seventy-two cases for which this information could be obtained. When an opinion awarded damages, 
the amount awarded was coded as the “amount at stake.” When the opinion did not state a monetary 
award, but noted the amount the plaintiff was seeking, this was coded as the amount at stake.
56 A case was coded as involving gap filling if the written contract in question was silent on the 
issue the usage purported to cover. Technically, under the Code, usages are part of the transactors’ 
legally enforceable agreement, so the nomenclature of referring to a gap filled by a usage is inconsistent 
with the jurisprudential foundation of the Code.
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dealt with the core aspects of most deals: price, quantity, quality, delivery, 
warranty, and payment.
Figure 2: Subject Matter of the Usage Issue in Interpretation Cases
Other Price Quantity Quality Delivery Warranty Payment
C. The Types o f  Evidence Introduced
The study also explored the type of trade usage evidence that was 
introduced to prove the existence and scope of usages. Figure 3 below 
provides the percentage of Study Group cases in which the following types 
of evidence were introduced: (1) testimony of plaintiffs or their employees; 
(2) testimony of defendants or their employees; (3) non-party testimony 
offered by defendant; (4) non-party testimony offered by plaintiff; and (5) 
trade codes.
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Figure 3: Types of Evidence Introduced in Usage-Related Cases
These findings are broken down further in the discussion that follows.
1. Trial.
a. Party or party employee evidence.—Across the Study Group 
cases that went to trial, the most common type of usage evidence 
introduced—or that parties sought to introduce—was the testimony of a 
party or a party’s own employee.57 In the cases where a trial was held58 and 
usage evidence was admitted, plaintiffs and/or their employees 
(“plaintiffs”) testified in 66% of the cases, while defendants and/or their 
employees (“defendants”) did so in 45.8%. In 63.15% of the cases, and in 
68.4% of the cases in which a usage was found to exist, employee 
testimony was the only usage-related evidence introduced.
b. Expert/Non-party witness evidence.—The study sought to 
examine how often expert testimony was introduced. However, it was often 
difficult to determine whether a particular witness was a fact witness, a lay 
opinion witness, or an expert witness, even in cases for which full 
transcripts were available. Given this limitation, all non-party or non-party- 
employed witnesses were coded together as non-party witnesses.
57 Former employees of a party were coded as employees of a party.
58 In the cases that went to trial, there was no statistically significant difference (using a two-sided 
Fisher’s exact test) between the opinion-only group and the detail group in the rate at which either 
plaintiffs (p = .28) or defendants (p = .30) introduced testimony of themselves or their employees 
between the opinion-only group and the detail group.
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Across the Study Group cases where a trial was held and the court 
admitted usage evidence, only 20.8% of plaintiffs and 22.9% of defendants 
introduced non-party testimony.59 Even in cases in which a trial was held 
and a usage was found to exist, only 31.5% involved the introduction of 
any non-party witness testimony.60 Since only some of the non-party 
witnesses would have qualified as experts, this data permits the conclusion 
that the introduction of non-party expert witness testimony is not required 
to establish the existence of a usage.61
c. Trade codes and similar writings.— Parties attempted to 
introduce trade codes and other trade association publications in 11% of the 
cases,62 but courts admitted such evidence in only 6% of the cases. In three 
of the five cases where the court admitted a trade code, it also found that a 
usage existed.
Interestingly, there was no statistically significant difference between 
the rate at which usages were found to exist in cases that went to trial and 
involved the introduction of only party evidence on the usage issue and 
cases that went to trial and involved the introduction of trade code-based or 
non-party witness testimony-based evidence on the usage issue.63
d. Regularity o f  observance.—The doctrinal requirement that, to 
qualify as a usage, a practice must be “regularly observed” was typically 
established (to the extent that it was addressed at all) through a mere
59 There was no statistically significant difference (using a two-sided Fisher’s exact test) between 
the detail and opinion-only groups in the rates with which plaintiffs or defendants introduced non-party 
witness testimony. This test was conducted to explore the possibility that even those opinions that 
detailed some of the usage-related evidence introduced might not faithfully recount all of the evidence 
introduced.
60 In these cases, 15.8% of plaintiffs and 21% of defendants introduced non-party witness 
testimony.
61 The inability to distinguish expert witnesses from lay opinion witnesses makes it impossible to 
establish whether or not expert testimony, when introduced in a particular case, was or was not treated 
as conclusive by courts.
62 The relative infrequency with which trade codes were introduced may be due, in part, to the fact 
that a large number of the industries that produce trade codes and association-drafted contracts have 
also created association-run arbitration tribunals to resolve disputes between their members, and 
between members as well as non-members when an arbitration provision is explicitly included in a 
contract. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 1 (describing the trade codes and arbitration tribunals created 
by the National Grain and Feed Association); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out o f the Legal System: 
Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992) (describing 
the trade codes and private arbitration tribunals used to resolve disputes in the New York diamond 
industry); Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation 
Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MlCH. L. REV. 1724 (2001) [hereinafter Bernstein, Creating 
Cooperation] (describing the trade rules and arbitration tribunals operative in the cash cotton trade).
63 A usage was found to exist in 85% of the cases in which a trial was held and only party 
testimony was introduced on the usage issue, and 73% of the cases where non-party testimony and/or a 
trade code was introduced.
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assertion by a witness that a practice was common or that they had never 
seen things done differently.64 Across the gap filling and interpretation 
cases in the Study Group, there was not a single instance in which a party 
sought to establish regularity of observance using statistical data about how 
frequently a practice was observed. Even in the cases with the largest 
stakes, the best lawyers, and the testimony of witnesses with traditional 
expert qualifications, proof of statistical regularity was still a matter of 
assertion and opinion.
The only type of case in which parties introduced evidence that a 
claimed usage had actually been observed in any specific transactions dealt 
with the battle of the forms. In six of these cases, the party who sought to 
have an additional term in its acceptance included in a contract introduced 
a few contracts drafted by others in their industry in an effort to establish 
that there were at least some specific instances where similar written terms 
were used.65 There were, however, no cases where the proffered evidence 
came close to establishing the frequency with which the practice was 
observed in a place, vocation, or trade.
2. Summary Judgment—Across the Study Group, 30.3% of the cases 
involved motions for summary judgment on a usage-related issue.66 In 65% 
of these cases, the non-movant raised the usage argument in an effort to 
defeat the motion.67 This tactic succeeded 70.6% of the time.
64 To get a feel for the types of evidence that courts accept as fulfilling the statutory requirement 
that the usage be regularly observed, consider the testimony that was actually introduced in Spurgeon v. 
Jamieson Motors, 521 P.2d 924 (Mont. 1974) where a trial was held and the court found the claimed 
usage to exist. In Spurgeon two of the defendant’s employees testified as to the usage of the used farm 
machinery trade. Ingeman Svendson testified that he had worked with farm machinery for forty years. 
When asked whether it was customary to warrant used combines, he said “no.” That was the extent of 
his testimony on the scope of the usage. Transcript of Record at 41, Spurgeon, 521 P.2d 924 (on file 
with author). Keith Jamieson also testified to Jamieson Motors’ policy of sharing repair costs 50-50 on 
newer used models and providing no additional warranties. He was then asked if this was “pretty much 
standard throughout the business in your trade.” He replied that it was. Id. at 79.
65 See. e.g., M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 970 P.2d 803 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1999), aff'd, 998 P.2d 305 (Wash. 2000) (where, in a high profile case that attracted an amicus brief 
from the Business Software Alliance because it had huge potential ramifications for the software 
industry, the defendant introduced fifteen “true copies of personal software license agreements from 15 
well known software developers” that included the provision it claimed was a usage).
66 In most jurisdictions, a denial of summary judgment is not a final order and is hence not 
appealable. As a consequence, these decisions are less likely to show up in digested opinions. It is 
therefore not possible to know how frequently usage arguments are used to defeat motions for summary 
judgment
67 Or, looked at from a different perspective, on motions for summary judgment plaintiffs raised the 
usage issue 28.6% of the time, while defendants did so 71.4% of the time.
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In 83.3% of the cases where a usage argument defeated a motion for 
summary judgment,68 the only evidence of the usage introduced by the non­
movant was an affidavit of one of its employees. This strongly suggests 
that courts do not, in fact, require a party to produce a great deal of 
evidence that a usage exists in order for a usage argument to successfully 
defeat a motion for summary judgment.69
In the 35% of the summary judgment cases where the party moving 
for summary judgment introduced a usage argument in support of its claim, 
summary judgment on the usage-related issue was granted 88.9% of the 
time (eight cases).70 However, it is not possible to determine from these 
cases the type or amount of usage evidence that courts require to grant 
summary judgment on a usage-related issue. In 75% of the cases where the 
motion was granted (six of eight cases), the usage-related issue was 
whether or not an additional written term in a variant acceptance was 
customary in the relevant industry.71 In all of these cases the movant
68 In three of the five cases where a usage argument did not defeat a motion for summary judgment, 
the non-movant introduced only its own or its employees’ testimony. In one of these cases, the court 
explicitly noted that it was inappropriate to rely on the testimony of a party or a party’s employees to 
defeat a motion for summary judgment. See Corestar Int’l Pte. Ltd. v. LPB Commc’ns, Inc., 513 F. 
Supp. 2d 107 (D.N.J. 2007). In the remaining two cases, the parties sought to introduce additional types 
of evidence but the court excluded the evidence. See Crescent Oil & Shipping Servs., Ltd. v. Phibro 
Energy, Inc., 929 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1991) (where the non-movant sought to introduce many maritime 
documents bearing on the usage it sought to allege, but the evidence was excluded by the lower court 
and considered and rejected by the appeals court as being insufficient to establish a usage); Golden 
Peanut Co. v. Hunt, 416 S.E.2d 896 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (noting that while the defendant had submitted 
affidavits from an employee and a non-employee as to the content of an alleged usage, the evidence was 
ruled inadmissible as it contradicted an express term of the contract).
69 50% were primary court decisions and 50% were appeals from a grant of summary judgment or a 
denial of summary judgment (one case was an interlocutory appeal by leave of court).
70 37% of these cases were at the trial level and 62.5% at the appellate level.
71 See Bayway Ref. Co. v. Oxygenated Mktg. & Trading A.G., 215 F.3d 219 (2d Cir. 2000) (where 
the movant-plaintiff introduced the testimony of two expert witnesses, and five industry contracts 
containing the disputed clause); M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 970 P.2d 803 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1999), aff’d, 998 P.2d 305 (Wash. 2000) (where the movant-defendant introduced two 
expert witnesses and copies of personal software license agreements from fifteen well-known software 
suppliers); Gooch v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 40 F. Supp. 2d 863 (W.D. Ky. 1999) (where 
movant-defendant introduced the deposition of the plaintiffs employee which included eleven other 
herbicide contracts for products he purchased which also included the clause at issue and the court 
noted that similar clauses had been upheld in other agricultural chemical cases); Stim v. E.I. DuPont de 
Nemours & Co., 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 979 (S.D. Ind. 1993) (where an attachment to the 
movant-defendant employee’s affidavit contained six labels from other chemical products produced by 
DuPont and others containing a similar limitation of remedy clause); Suzy Phillips Originals, Inc. v. 
Coville, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1012 (E.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d, No. 97-7042, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 41389 
(2d Cir. Oct. 2, 1997) (where the movant-defendant introduced the Worth Street Textile Market Rules 
to argue that a limitation of remedy clause in an acceptance was not a material alteration as it was 
standard in the textile industry and had been included in numerous previous contracts between the 
parties); Adcock v. Ramtreat Metal Tech., Inc., 44 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 1026, 1032 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 2001) (where the contract at issue was a trade association standard-form contract with a limitation 
of remedy provision that the plaintiff claimed was unconscionable, the defendant introduced an
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introduced evidence other than party and party employee testimony and the 
non-movant opposed the evidence only with legal arguments. In the 
remaining two cases, the court granted summary judgment based solely on 
the testimony of the parties or their employees. In neither of these cases did 
the party opposing the motion introduce any usage evidence of its own,72
There were only two cases where the parties presented conflicting 
evidence of usage. The court denied summary judgment in both of them.73
In sum, while Code commentators and academics have long expressed 
concern that courts might impose too high a requirement for establishing a 
trade usage, “for it is likely to be confused with ‘custom’ and the law has 
long encumbered proof of custom with stringent requirements,”74 precisely 
the opposite seems to be the case both in cases that go to trial and in 
motions for summary judgment.75
D. The Code’s Hierarchy o f Authority
In the Study Group cases, courts applying the Code’s hierarchy of 
authority were strongly inclined to view usage-based meanings as being 
consistent with express terms. Table 1 below sets out the contract 
provisions and the usage-based meanings asserted to explain them in the 
six inteipretation cases that went to trial and pitted a plain meaning against 
a usage-based meaning. In all but one case, the court accepted—or 
suggested that on remand the lower court should accept—the usage-based 
meaning over the plain meaning. In the remaining case, the court admitted 
the usage evidence but gave an erroneous jury instruction that it was only
affidavit of a trade association executive that the term was commonly used and was granted summary 
judgment in its favor).
72 Graaff v. Bakker Bros, of Idaho, Inc., 934 P.2d 1228, 1230 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (granting the 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment and finding the usage it asserted to exist, based only on an 
affidavit supplied by one of its employees); B/R Sales Co. v. Krantor Corp., 640 N.Y.S.2d 204 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1996) (granting summary judgment for the plaintiff, finding that the defendant had not 
rejected the goods within a reasonable time, which the plaintiffs employee testified was forty-eight 
hours under a usage of the trade).
73 See Rich Prods. Corp. v. Kemutec, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 937 (E.D. Wis. 1999), aff’d, 241 F.3d 
915 (7th Cir. 2001); Carter Baron Drilling v. Badger Oil Corp., 581 F. Supp. 592 (D. Colo. 1984).
74 White & Summers, supra note 38, at 144-45.
75 See also William Hoffman, On the Use and Abuse o f Custom and Usage in Reinsurance 
Contracts, 33 Tort & INS. L.J. 1, 4 (1997) (“A review of the growing number of reinsurance usage 
cases . . . suggests that counsel asserting a reinsurance usage often do not present, nor do the courts 
require, the evidence necessary [per the common law] to support a finding that a reinsurance usage 
affects the meaning of the contract. Further, the published opinions . . .  in these cases often lack any 
reference whatsoever to the applicable legal rules for proof of reinsurance usage,” and it is very rare for 
information about its prevalence in a local market or evidence of actual instances in which it was 
observed to be proffered).
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to be considered if the meaning of the contract was unclear.76 The jury 
found the contract to be clear.77
Table 1: Contract Provisions v . Usage-Based Meaning in Cases that Went to Trial
Contract Provision Usage
“Shell’s Posted Price at time of delivery”78
Shell’s price at the time the 
buyer bid a job
“[Cooling] capacity] shall not be less than 
indicated”79
Reasonable variation in cooling 
capacity is acceptable
“All cotton produced on 400 acres”80 400 acres o f cotton
“[S]hipment in September-October”81
“[D]elivery in O ctober- 
November”
“[A] minimum o f 31,000 tons o f phosphate 
each year”82
All quantity statements are 
estimates
Two contracts to deliver a total o f 100,000 cwt 
sacks o f potatoes83
All quantity statements are 
estimates
There were nine Study Group cases in which motions for summary 
judgment turned on an interpretation issue.84 In all of them the non-movant 
attempted to defeat the motion by alleging that a usage-based meaning 
should be used to interpret the agreement rather than its plain meaning. In 
two of these cases the court refused to consider the usage on the grounds
76 See supra note 34 and accompanying text (explaining that no ambiguity need be established for 
trade usage evidence to be considered).
77 Loeb & Co. v. Martin, 349 So. 2d 11, 12 (Ala. 1977) (where the court (erroneously) instructed 
the jury that if it found the contract term “All cotton produced on 400 acres” to be clear, it could not 
look to the usage to explain it).
78 Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772, 778 (9th Cir. 1981).
75 Modine Mfg. Co. v. Ne. Indep. Sch. Dist., 503 S.W.2d 833, 837 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
80 Loeb & Co., 349 So. 2d at 12.
81 Harlow & Jones, Inc. v. Advance Steel Co., 424 F. Supp. 770, 773 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
82 Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3, 6 (4th Cir. 1971) (holding that although the 
contract had a quantity provision that set out minimum tonnages evidence that under a trade usage all 
quantity statements were estimates and that the minimums were not binding should have been admitted 
as it was not inconsistent with the contract’s provisions).
83 Heggblade-Marguleas-Tenneco, Inc. v. Sunshine Biscuit, Inc., 131 Cal. Rptr. 183 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1976).
84 There was one additional case that could arguably have been added to this group but was not. In 
Steel & Wire Corp. v. Thyssen Inc., 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (West) 892 (E.D. Mich. 1976), the contract 
had a notice provision, which the plaintiff said was trumped by usage. The court found that the length 
of time the plaintiff took to give notice was unreasonable under U.C.C. § 2-607 without any need for 
recourse to usage evidence, which the court said was relevant to the interpretation of contracts, but not 
to the interpretation of the Code’s gap-filling provisions. Id. at 898-99.
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that it was prohibited by the parties’ contract;85 in two other cases the court 
refused to consider the usage on the grounds that it had not been adequately 
proven;86 and in one case the court refused to consider the usage both 
because it had not been proven and because, even if established, it would 
have conflicted with the terms of the written agreement.87 In the remaining 
four cases, set out in Table 2 below, the court denied the motion for 
summary judgment, and did not note any inconsistency between the 
asserted usage and the express terms.
Table 2: Contract Provisions v. Usage-Based Meanings in Summary 
Judgment Cases
Contract Provision Usage
“500 Gross Ton”88 Up to 500 gross ton
“March delivery”89 Delivery in late spring
“Operator shall pay contractor”90 Operator shall pay contractor only 
when paid by the owner
The bull being sold is an “active breederQ,” 
whose semen should be tested “shortly before 
the breeding season”91
Bull should be tested later than 
beginning o f the season so he can 
mature
In sum, the data reveal that courts in the Study Group cases were inclined 
to find usage-based meanings consistent with even seemingly contradictory
85 See Golden Peanut Co. v. Hunt, 416 S.E.2d 896, 897 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (where the court 
refused to consider usage evidence on the meaning of the contract term “bona fide offer” on the grounds 
that the contract provided that “[n]o parol evidence shall be relevant to supplement or explain this 
agreement,” overlooking the fact that usages are not considered parol evidence under the Code, but 
rather are part of the very definition of the parties’ agreement); Madison Indus., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak 
Co., 581 A.2d. 85, 90 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (noting in dicta that due to a clause in the 
contract, usage evidence would have been inadmissable even if the Code applied to the transaction).
86 Corestar Int’l Pte. Ltd. v. LPB Commc’ns, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 107 (D.N.J. 2007) (where the 
contract had a fixed delivery date that was not met, and the defendant claimed (through the assertions of 
one of his employees) that per a usage the dates were mere estimates, the court nonetheless granted the 
plaintiff summary judgment, saying the defendant had not provided enough evidence of the usage); 
Crescent Oil & Shipping Servs., Ltd. v. Phibro Energy, Inc., 929 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1991) (affirming a 
court’s grant of summary judgment for the plaintiff based on the plain meaning of the term “discharge 
port” in a pricing term, explaining that the evidence of usage tendered was insufficient).
87 See Bib Audio-Video Prods, v. Herold Mktg. Assocs., 517 N.W.2d 68, 72-73 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1994) (granting summary judgment on the contract’s plain meaning, explaining that the usage offered to 
defeat the motion was not proven and that evidence of it should have been inadmissible as it 
contradicted the contract’s plain meaning).
88 Michael Schiavone & Sons, Inc. v. Securalloy Co., 312 F. Supp. 801, 804 (D. Conn. 1970).
89 Dreyfus Co. v. Royster Co., 501 F. Supp. 1169, 1172-73 (E.D. Ark. 1980).
90 Carter Baron Drilling v. Badger Oil Corp., 581 F. Supp. 592, 593 (D. Colo. 1984).
91 Campbell Farms v. Wald, 578 N.W.2d 96, 97 (N.D. 1998).
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express terms. However, because trial courts can exclude evidence of 
usages if they conclude (as a matter o f law) that the usage is inconsistent 
with the express terms, the data cannot rule out the possibility that in cases 
that go to trial and do not result in published opinions, courts may be more 
inclined (than suggested by the data above) to find that usage-based 
meanings conflict with the plain meaning of express terms. Nonetheless, 
because the published cases are the precedents on which courts base their 
decisions and lawyers base their legal advice, it is likely (though not 
certain) that the shadow effect of these published decisions on the run of 
cases decided without opinion is significant.
E. Methodological Issues
Before exploring the implications of this data, it is important to 
highlight the study’s methodological limitations—most notably that its 
findings may have been influenced by the types of selection effects that are 
present in research that relies on cases decided by reported opinions.92
First, given the origin of the data, a selection effect of the classic 
Priest-Klein93 variety may have introduced bias into some of the results 
relating to the types and quantum of evidence introduced. The study 
therefore cannot definitively rule out the possibility that more or different 
trade usage evidence was introduced in the cases that were decided without 
an opinion. However, there are several considerations that suggest that the 
selection effect problem does not entirely undermine the study’s findings.
Across the appellate cases in the Study Group, only 13.4% involved 
an appeal o f a usage issue standing alone. Most cases involved the appeal 
of multiple issues— 22.4% involved two issues, 29.9% involved three 
issues, and 34.3% involved four or more issues. These data suggest that any 
selection effect related to the quantum of usage evidence introduced is 
likely to be quite noisy. In addition, only a small percentage of the cases, 
for reasons discussed further below, were cases where the court was faced 
with one party’s evidence that the usage was A and another party’s 
evidence that the usage was B, and had to decide between them. This is a 
classic situation in which the Priest-Klein selection effect with respect to 
the strength and quantum of evidence introduced would be the greatest.
92 In comparison to the entire population of cases that wind up in court, cases decided with a 
reported opinion tend to be disproportionately in federal court (trial or appellate), one of the rare state 
trial court decisions memorialized in a published opinion, or state cases that involved an appeal that 
resulted in a published decision.
93 See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection o f Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. Legal 
S t u d . 1 (19S4). For an overview of the Priest-Klein selection effect, see generally Joel Waldfogel, 
Selection o f Cases for Trial, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 419 
(Peter Newman ed., 1998).
85
N O R T H WE S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  LAW RE VI E W
Rather, in approximately 75% of the cases in the Study Group, one party 
submitted evidence of usage while the other party claimed that the usage 
evidence was inadmissible based on a legal argument other than that the 
evidence submitted was insufficient to meet the burden of proof. In these 
cases, there is no reason to think that a selection effect is operating to make 
cases with weaker evidence go to appeal. In fact, for cases in some 
postures, the selection effect might well lead to a bias in favor of cases with 
stronger evidence of usage making it into the published reports.94
Second, the study’s results about the types of issues that arise may 
have been affected by a factual issue-based selection effect. This effect 
arises because cases that go to trial and turn on factual rather than legal 
issues are unlikely to be appealed given the tremendous deference given to 
trial courts’ findings of fact. This selection effect might account, at least in 
part, for the small number of cases involving gap filling or looking to usage 
to give meaning to standard-like provisions. In these types of cases, one 
party will typically claim the usage is A, and the other that the usage is B, 
so whichever way the court rules, an appeal, and with it a reported 
decision, is unlikely to occur since the probability of obtaining a reversal is 
very low.
In an effort to explore the possibility that this type of fact-issue-based 
selection bias is responsible for the infrequency of these types of cases, a
94 To see why, consider the following four situations: (1) Suppose that at trial the plaintiff seeks to 
introduce a usage, and the defendant seeks to exclude it. Suppose further that the court admits the 
usage, it is found to exist and the plaintiff prevails, and the defendant is deciding whether to appeal. His 
decision will be based on his estimate of the strength of his legal argument on appeal, not on the 
strength of the plaintiffs usage evidence. If, on the other hand, the court said the evidence did not 
establish a usage (meaning the evidence was weak), the defendant would not be likely to appeal since 
the fact that it was admitted did not affect the outcome. The plaintiff in such a situation is also unlikely 
to appeal, because appellate courts do not ordinarily reverse factual determinations of this sort except in 
egregious cases. (2) Now suppose that the court excludes the plaintiffs evidence of usage and the 
plaintiff must decide whether to appeal. Holding constant the strength of the plaintiffs legal argument 
on appeal, the plaintiff will be more likely to appeal if the evidence he proffers will, if admitted, be 
sufficient to establish the existence of a usage. Thus, the selection effect here should produce more 
frequent appeals when the plaintiffs evidence is strong than when it is weak. (3) Suppose that at trial 
the defendant seeks to introduce usage evidence, the plaintiff claims that it should be excluded, and the 
court admits the usage. If the usage is found to exist, the plaintiffs decision on whether to appeal will 
be based on his evaluation of the strength of his legal argument. If the court finds that the usage does 
not exist, the plaintiff will not appeal and neither will the defendant, as reversals of findings of fact are 
rare. Since cases in which a usage is found to exist should feature admission of stronger, rather than 
weaker, evidence, there is no reason to think that cases with weaker evidence are being weeded out of 
the sample, and in fact the reverse seems to be true. (4) Finally, suppose that the defendant seeks to 
introduce usage and the court excludes it. Holding the strength of the defendant’s legal argument 
constant, the defendant will be more likely to appeal if his usage evidence is strong, since the likelihood 
is greater that if he is successful on the legal appeal and the case is remanded, the outcome of the case 
will change. In sum, in cases that arise in this posture, the selection effect, if any, inclines towards cases 
with stronger evidence of usage being more likely to appear in the appellate courts than cases where 
usages are weak.
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data set was constructed that looked at the Westlaw Trial Court Document 
Database for Illinois State and Federal Court Filings.95 A search of the term 
“usage of trade” turned up 170 hits for the years 1999-2010, a total of 104 
independent cases. After excluding the types of cases that the large study 
excluded,96 and cases that merely cited statutory language referring to 
usage, without asserting that a usage existed or suggesting that a usage- 
based argument was in the offing, twenty-four cases remained. O f these 
cases, one (4.2%) involved gap filling in the context of a contract by 
conduct, one (4.2%) involved filling a gap in a written contract, and one 
(4.2%) involved making a general clause more specific. These findings 
echo the results of the case study in terms of the type of trade usage issues 
that wind up in courts. Whether or not gap filling or giving meaning to 
standard-like provisions by usage is occurring in the shadow of the law— or 
in the shadow of extra-legal understandings— in disputes that arise but do 
not result in legal filings cannot be determined.
In light o f these methodological limitations, and mindful of the fact 
that their magnitude cannot be quantified, the next Part re-examines the 
core theoretical arguments used to justify the incorporation o f trade usages 
and other commercial practices in light of the study’s findings.
III. Revisiting Incorporation on Its Own Terms
This Part integrates the study’s findings into the theoretical debates 
over the desirability of the incorporation strategy. It begins by discussing 
the implications o f the data for interpretive error costs, the component of 
the incorporation strategy that the empirical study was designed to most 
directly explore. It then considers how this data, together with the study’s 
findings about the types of cases that arise, the ways that courts interpret 
and apply the Code’s hierarchy of authority, and the ways that information 
about contract terms is transmitted through large multi-agent firms, bear on 
the incorporationists’ claim that the strategy is likely to reduce 
specification costs.
A. Interpretive Error Costs
1. Evidence on Interpretive Error Costs.—Incorporationists
recognize that the strategy may slightly increase interpretive error costs—
95 The database is Illinois Trial Court Documents and according to Westlaw it includes “selected 
motions, trial court memoranda, trial pleadings and other civil trial filings from the Illinois state and 
federal courts.” Illinois Trial Court Documents, WESTLAW, web2.westlaw.com/ 
scope/default.aspx?db=IL%2DFILING%2DALL&RP=/scope/default. wl&RS=WLW 11,07&VR=2.0& 
SV=Split&FN=_top&MT=208&MST= (last visited Oct. 24, 2015).
96 See supra note 45.
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that is, the costs of courts mistakenly finding usages to exist when they do 
not, the costs of courts making errors in defining the scope and content of 
usages, and the cost of courts mistakenly incorporating extralegal 
understandings into legally enforceable contracts. They maintain, however, 
that any increase in these costs is likely to be insignificant because a party 
seeking to establish the existence and scope of a usage will have to 
introduce “objective evidence of a business norm”97 such as expert witness 
testimony, industry trade codes, statistical evidence that a practice is 
regularly observed, or, at a minimum, some examples of actual commercial 
transactions in which the practice was followed.98
The study demonstrated, however, that “objective” usage-related 
evidence was neither commonly introduced nor required by courts to 
establish the existence of a usage. Parties only introduced or sought to 
introduce “objective evidence” in the form of non-party testimony or a 
written trade code in 39.8% of the Study Group cases. Even among the 
cases that went to trial and found a usage to exist, objective evidence was 
only introduced 38.4% of the time. On motions for summary judgment, 
parties introduced objective evidence in only 16% of the cases where a 
usage-based argument succeeded in defeating the motion.99 And, even more 
notably, there was not a single case in the Study Group in which the 
regularity of observance was established by data rather than by mere 
witness assertion. Moreover, there were only six cases in which either party 
introduced any evidence that the usage had been observed in any actual 
transactions other than those between the parties to the dispute. In sum, the 
study confirmed Llewellyn’s prediction, expressed during the New York 
Law Reform Commission hearings on the proposed Code, that in the 
absence of a merchant jury provision, disputes over the content of trade 
usage would turn primarily on the word of the buyer’s man and the seller’s 
man.100
Although the Code could, in theory, be amended to require the 
existence of a usage to be proven through the introduction of particular 
types of evidence such as expert witness testimony, trade codes,101 or data
97 Walt, supra note 7, at 277.
98 Id. at 271-75.
99 Across all motions for summary judgment, parties attempted to introduce objective evidence in 
30.3% of the cases.
100 See supra note 2.
101 Given that the theory behind incorporating unwritten usages is that they arise from the 
competitive selection of rules and practices and are presumptively efficient and reasonable given their 
widespread use by merchants, looking to trade codes and standard form contracts as proxies for usage is 
conceptually problematic. First, although trade codes are often assumed to be mere codifications of 
customs, a look at their preambles and the process through which they are adopted reveals that their
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showing that a practice is, in fact, widely observed, as discussed further 
below, practical and conceptual concerns suggest that interpretive error 
costs would remain significant.
2. Practical and Conceptual Problems in Proving Usages.—Even if 
the Code were amended to require the submission of statistical information 
about “regularity o f observance,” there are practical barriers to the 
compilation of such evidence. Many businesses are reluctant to share 
information about their contracting relationships. Confidentiality 
provisions, many of which preclude the parties from revealing even the 
existence of a contracting relationship, are common in large business 
contracts102 and firms are likely to fear that inquiring into the contracting 
practices of their competitors could be viewed as anti-competitive. 
Moreover, even if these and other practical barriers to obtaining this type of 
statistical information were overcome, courts would not necessarily be able 
to use this type of evidence to identify “such regularity of observance in a 
place, vocation or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be observed” 
in any particular transaction.103 To see why, it is useful to think about 
several concrete examples of the ways such evidence might be interpreted.
Consider a contract for the supply of electronic components in the 
computer industry where there is a highly variable demand for the 
computer manufacturer’s end product. In such contexts, the manufacturer’s 
procurement department often adopts a portfolio approach to quantity
drafters had to choose among customs and often quite explicitly sought to improve upon, rather than 
merely codify, existing practices. See Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis o f Article 2 's 
Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 710 (1999) [hereinafter Bernstein, 
Questionable Empirical Basis], Second, while associations whose members are buyers one day and 
sellers the next and that also have well-constructed committee structures and voting rules may generate 
the types of trade rules and standard-form contract provisions that are likely to be efficient, see, e.g., 
Lisa Bernstein, The NGFA Arbitration System at Work, NGFA (Mar. 15, 2007),
http://www.ngfa.org/wp-content/uploads/trade_rules/Arbitration-Study.pdf [http://perma.cc/FU72- 
S873], many associations will not. There are many trade associations that represent only buyers or only 
sellers, and some trade associations that run private legal systems govern transactions between members 
who play fixed roles in the chain of production and distribution, making rent-seeking in trade rules and 
standard-form contract creation a serious potential issue. See Bernstein, Questionable Empirical Basis. 
As a consequence, in order to determine which association rules and standard-form contract provisions 
should be incorporated as substitutes for unwritten usages that evolve over time, courts would need to 
engage in a detailed game theoretic analysis of the associations’ rules-creation process, an inquiry that 
is likely to exceed the limits of their institutional competence. See Robert D. Cooter, Structural 
Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A Model o f Decentralized Law, 14 INT’L REV. L. & ECON 
215 (1994).
102 For examples of such clauses, see Lisa Bernstein, Private Ordering, Social Capital, and 
Network Governance in Procurement Contracts: A Preliminary Exploration, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
(forthcoming 2015) and examples cited therein.
103 U.C.C. § 1-205(2) (2001).
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management.104 It enters into one contract for a fixed-quantity of the 
component based on the relatively certain part of the forecasted demand for 
the company’s end product. It then enters into a variable quantity contract 
(valid over a specified range of quantities) with either the same or a 
different component supplier. Any additional components needed are 
purchased on the spot market. The price differential between a fixed and a 
flexible quantity-components contract can be large. At Hewlett Packard, 
this price differential is estimated to be 15%, yet the company still 
purchases significant quantities of most components through flexible 
quantity contracts.105 If one were simply to look at contracting behavior 
under contracts in this industry, one might well see variations in the 
quantity delivered under a majority of the contracts. However, such an 
observation, even if accurate, would not tell us whether in a nominally 
fixed quantity contract there is really a usage to vary the quantity.
More generally, as this example demonstrates, in order to accurately 
determine whether a usage exists, it may be necessary to explore the types 
and distribution of contract provisions in the relevant market that are 
related to the subject of the usage. Otherwise, it would be impossible to 
determine whether there was a usage of “fixed quantities” meaning 
“variable quantities,” or simply an underlying population of contracts 
where variable quantity provisions were more common. However, as 
explained above, this type of information is unlikely to be available given 
firms’ reluctance to share information about their contracts, contracting 
partners, and contracting practices.
The conceptual problems with demonstrating usages however, go 
beyond the need for data that will almost never be available. To better 
understand why interpreting even good data on behavioral regularities 
might not yield an accurate picture of the existence or nonexistence of a 
usage even if all of the underlying contracts in the market were identical, 
consider the following scenario: on December 30, 2010, two parties enter 
into a contract for the delivery of 100 bales of hay on the first of each 
month over the calendar year 2011 for a price of $50 per bale. On April 20, 
2011, the price of hay suddenly increases and on May 1 the seller delivers 
only 85 bales, claiming either that there is a usage in the hay business that 
quantity statements in contracts are only estimates or that delivering any
104 See, e.g., Venu Nagali et a t, Procurement Risk Management (PRM) at Hewlett-Packard 
Company, 38 INTERFACES 51 (2008).
105 Global Logistics & Supply Chain Strategies, HP Invents New Framework for Managing Supply 
Chain Risk, Supply  CHAIN Bra in , http://www.supplychainbrain.com/content/research-analysis/supply- 
chain-innovation-awards/single-article-page/article/hp-invents-new-framework-for-managing-supply- 
chain-risk-1/ [http://perma.cc/24E2-S2V4]. See also, Nagali et at, supra note 104, at 58.
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amount plus or minus 20 bales is considered acceptable under a trade 
usage.106 Suppose that the case goes to trial and the seller introduces a study 
which looked at 100 contracts that called for the delivery of 100 bales of 
hay on the first of the month and found that: under one third of the 
contracts 80 bales were tendered and accepted; under another third, 100 
bales were tendered and accepted; and under the final third, 120 bales were 
tendered and accepted. If the court looked at this data through the lens of 
the Code and Official Comments, it would likely conclude that the data 
established a usage that when a contract says 100 bales, 100 bales plus or 
minus 20 bales is considered proper or customary tender.
Given the structure and operation of the hay trade, however, a more 
accurate interpretation o f this behavior is that the contractual relations 
observed were among transactors who trusted one another and dealt with 
one another on a repeat basis, so that within any individual relationship 
where 80 bales were accepted one month, a look at the next month’s tender 
would show 120 bales were tendered. Among parties who trust one another 
and have sufficient inventory, it might be much cheaper to take the level of 
precaution that results in an average of 100 bales per month being 
delivered, rather than the level of precaution associated with delivering 
exactly 100 bales each time. Yet if relations between these parties broke 
down and they did not anticipate dealing with one another in the future, and 
one party delivered 85 at a time when the price had risen substantially 
above the contract price, to excuse delivery of the additional 15 bales on 
the basis o f a usage would be far from implementing the parties’ intent.107
As this example illustrates, courts face interpretive difficulties in these 
situations because transactors’ willingness to make the types of adjustments 
that look on their surface like behavioral regularities often depends on the 
existence or non-existence of conditions whose existence or relevance in a 
particular case may be observable to the parties but not verifiable by a 
court. These include the degree of trust between the transactors, the 
expected benefit of future dealings, and the likelihood that the difference 
will be made up in a future deal even if the market price makes it non- 
advantageous to do so. Transactors’ willingness to make these adjustments 
may also reflect implicit understandings such as that quantity variations are 
only acceptable when prices are stable, or that late delivery is only
106 Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971) (quantity statements are 
mere estimates); Heggblade-Marguleas-Tenneco, Inc. v. Sunshine Biscuit, Inc., 131 Cal. Rptr. 183, 189 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (same).
107 See Alan Schwartz, Karl Llewellyn and the Origins o f Contract Theory, in THE 
Jurisprudential Foundations of Corporate and Commercial Law 12 (Jody S. Kraus & Steven 
D. Walt eds., 2000) (noting that Llewellyn’s academic writing explicitly recognized this possibility).
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acceptable when there are adverse weather conditions. As a consequence, 
when courts incorporate behavioral regularities into contracts as trade 
usages, some of the regularities they incorporate are likely to be the types 
of norms that transactors are willing to follow when they want to preserve 
their relationship—“relationship preserving” or “informal norms”—but that 
they would have been unwilling to promise to follow in their written 
agreement for any of a number of reasons.108 When courts incorporate 
informal norms into commercial agreements, they may well be acting 
directly contrary to the parties’ intent and may therefore be creating large 
interpretive error costs.
Incorporationists view the incorporation of informal norms as 
“simply. . . another potential source of interpretive error [costs].”109 
However, when courts routinely incorporate informal norms the 
consequences for efficient contracting are more significant than when 
courts simply make occasional errors in filling gaps or determining the 
meaning of written contractual provisions. In contexts where both formal 
and informal norms are common and nonlegal sanctions (including 
termination of dealing) are sufficiently strong, transactors will often find it 
beneficial to structure their contracting relationship using a mix of (1) 
legally enforceable promises that condition on verifiable infonnation, and 
(2) informal agreements—both express and tacit—that turn on information 
that may only be observable. The incorporation strategy, however, 
transforms most of the commitments reflected in both formal and informal 
norms into legally enforceable contract obligations. This makes it very 
difficult—if not impossible—for transactors to fully realize the significant 
efficiency gains that this two-tiered contractual structure may offer. 
Transactors must either bear the interpretive error costs that come with the 
mis-incorporation of informal norms, or structure their relationships using a 
set of second-best terms that they are willing to follow in their work-a-day 
interactions and have courts enforce in the event of a dispute.
Incorporationists maintain that the incorporation of informal norms is 
unlikely to cause significant problems given their “speculation” that 
“observable patterns of commercial behavior more often than not reflect 
formal rather than informal norms,”110 and their contention that the Code 
does not require courts to take informal norms into account. However, they 
do not offer any empirical evidence that most commercial norms are
108 For a comprehensive discussion of the ways that relationship-preserving norms and end-game 
norms impact commercial behavior and the consequences of confusing them in adjudication, see 
Bernstein, supra note 1.
109 Kraus & Walt, supra note 6, at 209.
110 Id. at 210.
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formal, 111 and there is nothing in the Code or its Official Comments to 
suggest that courts have the authority to distinguish between formal and 
informal norms. The Code defines the existence of a trade usage by the 
regularity of its observance and the reasonableness of the expectation that it 
will be observed in a particular contracting relationship. Applying these 
criteria, informal norms are often indistinguishable from formal norms112 
because transactors, particularly those in repeat-dealing relationships, fully 
expect one another to abide by many informal norms, at least when the 
implicit pre-conditions for their relevance are met.
Moreover, even if the Code were interpreted, or explicitly amended, to 
give courts the authority to incorporate only formal norms, such a rule 
would be difficult to implement. Incorporationists suggest that “[t]he 
paradigm evidence of an informal norm [can be] provided by tradewide 
testimony that a practice is not intended to be given legal effect, ” 113 and that 
any transactor in the relevant market could be called to testify about their 
own subjective beliefs about whether a usage was meant to be legally 
enforceable. However, absent the type of social scientific survey that would 
be prohibitively expensive to conduct and that transactors would be 
hesitant to participate in, it is unclear how the general subjective 
understanding of transactors across a relevant market could be reliably 
established.
In sum, the conceptual difficulties in proving usages suggest that the 
interpretive error costs occasioned by the strategy cannot, as 
incorporationists have maintained, be reduced to an acceptable level
111 In defending this position, incorporationists explain that because “informal norms most 
commonly will develop in the context of relational, rather than discrete, contracts..  . and [m]any, 
perhaps a majority, of the transactions governed by Article 2 are discrete,” informal norms will not be 
common in contracting relationships governed by the Code. Id. However, the data show that a 
significant proportion of the interpretation cases arising under the Code involve transactors who have 
dealt with one another before, often over an extended period of time. Across the cases that went to trial 
on an interpretation issue, at least 43.7% involved transactors who had previously dealt with one 
another. More importantly, however, incorporationists pverlook the fact that the existence or non­
existence of the type of informal norms that will appear to be behavioral regularities across a market or 
industry is not determined only by the characteristics of the parties to a particular dispute, but also by 
structural and interpersonal features of the relevant market. These sorts of norms are likely to arise 
when many transactions in the market are repeat and the same types of adjustments and/or contractual 
flexibility will benefit a large number of transactors. In such contexts, if a case goes to court, the 
regularity of behavior in the market (the supposed predicate for finding a usage) is independent of 
whether the case at bar is a dispute between transactors with a longstanding relationship, or transactors 
who have never dealt with one another before. As a consequence, the number of discrete or repeat 
relationships that wind up in court is a poor proxy for the risk that informal norms will be mistakenly 
incorporated.
112 In markets where such norms are common, they are often backed by an array of non-legal 
sanctions that make them, in effect, self-enforcing over a range of typical market conditions. It is 
therefore quite likely that they will, in fact, be observed by a majority of transactors most of the time.
113 Kraus & Walt, supra note 6, at 208.
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through procedural and evidentiary changes in how usages must be 
demonstrated.114 Even if the Code were amended to require the introduction 
of the types of objective usage evidence incorporationists envision, usage- 
related evidence would remain difficult for parties to obtain and difficult 
for courts to interpret. Moreover, as discussed further below, such changes 
would also fail to eliminate the negative effect that usage-based arguments 
and evidence have on the outcomes of motions for summary judgment.
3. Interpretive Error Costs and Motions for Summary Judgment.—
The conceptual debate over the magnitude of the interpretive error
costs introduced by incorporation has largely ignored the strategy’s effect 
on motions for summary judgment. However, the usage study revealed that 
a party opposing a motion for summary judgment can assert the existence 
of a usage plausibly enough to defeat the motion based on nothing more 
than a cursory affidavit supplied by one of its own employees. Indeed, in 
83.3% of the cases where the party who raised the usage issue succeeded in 
defeating a motion for summary judgment, an affidavit from its employees 
was the only usage-related evidence introduced. This suggests that 
summary judgment determinations may be subject to significant 
interpretive error costs and may enable transactors to more easily engage in 
potentially costly strategic behavior by falsely asserting the existence of a 
usage to defeat summary judgment and thereby obtain a more favorable 
settlement. More generally, because 32.4% of the cases in the Study Group 
involved motions for summary judgment, any evaluation of the 
incorporation strategy’s merits must take into account its effect on motions 
for summary judgment.
4. Conclusion.—In sum, the central finding of the empirical study— 
that trade usages are not typically proven through the introduction of either 
“objective” evidence or statistical norms—might even give pause to 
incorporation’s strongest defenders. As they have explained, “[A]n analysis 
counts as an interpretation of custom only if it adequately fits relevant 
commercial behavior and attitudes [demonstrated through actual instances 
of commercial behavior]. Otherwise, the analysis is not an interpretation of 
anything. It instead serves as a recommended decision rule.”115 Indeed, a 
broader look at the cases in the study suggests that usage evidence, along 
with the economic and business rationales proffered to explain it, may, in 
practice, be serving as just such a “recommended decision rule.”
114 Id. at 221-24 (suggesting that critiques of the UCC’s incorporation strategy could easily be 
dealt with through changes in the procedural and evidentiary rules relating to trade usage evidence and 
are not endemic to incorporationist adjudicative approaches more generally).
115 Id. at 205.
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Understood in this light, the incorporation strategy might be defended as 
providing courts with contextual information that helps them decide cases 
in a commercially sensible way. However, to conclude that the types of 
usage evidence introduced in typical Article 2 cases frequently establish a 
“usage of trade,” as that term is defined in the Code, is in practice a legal 
fiction.
B. Specification Costs
Given the study’s findings about the interpretive error and uncertainty 
costs created by the incorporation strategy, it is useful to revisit the core 
theoretical defense of the strategy—namely, that its “chief virtue” lies in its 
“promise” to reduce specification costs in its shadow.116
1. The Theory and Limited Empirical Evidence on 
Specification Costs.—The claim that the incorporation strategy 
reduces specification costs starts from the empirically unsubstantiated 
assumption that a majority of merchant transactors want contracts to be 
given their usage-based meaning.117 Incorporationists speculate that when 
transactors know that courts will look to usages to fill gaps and interpret 
their agreements, they will ignore remote contingencies, leave more 
contractual gaps, and will choose to forgo drafting complex (and 
expensive) written provisions, in favor of either standard-like provisions 
that are inexpensive to draft, or provisions that include terse industry- 
specific short-hand phrases that implicitly reference complex “terms that 
have domain-specific meanings”118 or reflect inchoate understandings that 
“carry with them an array of implications that might be difficult even to 
bring to mind, let alone commit to paper.”119 Together, these drafting 
choices are said to significantly reduce specification costs.
Although the study of usage in the courts was not designed to directly 
test the strategy’s effect on specification costs,120 its findings are strikingly 
inconsistent with what one would expect to find if transactors were taking
116 Id. at 193.
117 This assumption is not only empirically unsubstantiated, but also goes against the weight of 
what limited empirical evidence is available. See infra notes 159, 168, and accompanying text.
118 Kraus & Walt, supra note 6, at 199.
119 Id. If courts do incorporate usages of this description, these usages will become defacto 
mandatory rules, since transactors who want to exclude them will not be able to carefully state and 
negate them in a contract. See also Quinn, supra note 28, Form 4, at 1-28 (noting that a contract 
provision that seeks to specifically negate a usage should include a statement describing the usage to be 
negated).
120 The incorporationists themselves explicitly acknowledge that there is no “[d]irect survey or 
experimental evidence” about the size of these specification cost savings and that any estimates must 
necessarily be “indirect, based on inferences from other data.” Walt, supra note 7, at 278.
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advantage of the specification cost savings the strategy might create.121 If 
the strategy influenced drafting choices in the ways incorporationists 
suggest, a significant number of trade usage cases would deal with gap 
filling, allocating risks arising from remote contingencies, giving meaning 
to standard-like provisions, incorporating inarticulable usages, and 
discerning the complex meanings attached to short-hand industry terms of 
art.122 However, this is not, for the most part, what the study found.
Across the Study Group only 9.9% of the cases involved gap filling 
and none dealt with remote contingencies.123 These findings are 
confirmed—albeit weakly, due to the small number of cases—by the pilot 
study of the usage-related issues raised in Illinois case filings. In addition, 
the detail group did not include a single case in which usage evidence was 
introduced to give meaning to a standard-like term. Most of these cases 
involved usages that were introduced to “interpret” a clear, detailed, or 
highly specific clause embedded in a detailed agreement. While it is 
impossible to rule out the possibility that transactors were trying to 
establish the existence of complex usages that could only be articulated ex 
post, none of the usages alleged in any of the cases would have been 
complex or difficult to articulate at the time of contracting.
The only incorporationist prediction that was borne out in the Study 
was that usages were commonly introduced to give meaning to industry- 
specific terms of art. This was done in 32% of the interpretation cases that 
went to trial and one interpretation case that involved a motion for
121 There is no way to directly test whether the availability of the incorporation strategy decreases 
specification costs. To do this, one would need a representative sample of contracts from a cross-section 
of industries, a jurisdiction with similar demographics that adopted a formalist interpretive approach 
(which is impossible given that the UCC has been adopted in every state but Louisiana), and controls 
that would take into account the wide variety of other considerations that might affect firms’ drafting 
decisions. Furthermore, even if this data were available, it would be difficult to definitively interpret. If 
the data revealed that there were lots of vague and standard-like provisions relating to core terms, it 
would make plausible the incorporationists’ claims that transactors include such provisions intending 
that they be given their customary meaning. However, the presence of such provisions might be equally 
compatible with the explanation that transactors think that they will have more information by the time 
the clause becomes relevant and that this information will help them negotiate (or renegotiate) a better 
provision than they could have agreed on at the time of contracting. Similarly, if the study revealed very 
detailed contracting about core matters, this would not necessarily indicate that transactors wanted to 
reject the incorporation strategy, as there are many reasons for memorializing obligations in writing 
apart from clarity for the sake of judicial enforcement. See Bernstein, supra note 102 (discussing the 
many different roles that detailed written contract provisions and specification play in complex 
commercial deals).
122 The argument in the text assumes that the study cases are representative of the underlying 
population. See supra text accompanying notes 92-96 (discussing the limitations of the data and the 
small-scale examination of Illinois filings which suggests, though does not prove, that the selection 
effect does not undermine the validity of the findings in this respect).
123 The study defined a “remote contingency” as a low probability event that did not relate to the 
core terms of the deal.
96
110:63 (2015) Custom in the Courts
summary judgment.124 Although the use of these terms of art may have 
slightly reduced specification costs, a comparison of the terms of art 
invoked and the usages proffered to give them meaning (set out in Table 3 
below) suggests that the magnitude of the specification cost reduction 
realized through the invocation of these terms of art may be less significant 
than incorporationists suggest. First, at least a third of these contracts were 
standard form contracts, so any costs of specifying the meaning of the 
terms would likely have been prorated over many contracts. Second, most 
of the definitions at issue were simple to state concisely and all related to 
the core terms of any agreement, with 67% relating to definitions of 
quality.
Table 3: Contract Provision v . Usage-Based Meaning in Cases that Went to Trial
(Study Group)
Contract Provision Usage-Based Meaning
“[H]igh-quality SEW pig[]”125 Pig must cut out at 51% lean
“[FJirst quality”126 No flaws versus 3% -5%  flawed
“ [S]law cabbage”127
Big cabbage versus any cabbage that can be 
made into cole slaw
“Scotch Mint Roots . . .  o f a 
good solid stand”128
Maximum 10% contamination
“[B]arren”129
Barren does not mean a horse that conceived 
and aborted
“85% chemical[ly] lean”130 Excludes BCVL quality designation
“Agricultural Grade CAN”131 CAN that is granular
“[Ajcres”132 Acres with every row planted
However, in thinking about the implications of Table 3 for the 
magnitude of specification costs more generally, it is important to
124 See Crescent Oil & Shipping Servs., Ltd. v. Phibro Energy, Inc., 929 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1991) 
(whether the meaning of the term “NOR discharge port” meant “an NOR issued at the first lightering 
port,” or “the NOR issued at the designated and agreed discharge port”).
125 Trumm v. Feeder’s Supply, Inc., 49 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 44, 46 (Iowa Ct. App. 2002).
126 Foxco Indus., Ltd. v. Fabric World, Inc., 595 F.2d 976, 979 (5th Cir. 1979).
127 Williams v. Curtin, 807 F.2d 1046, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
128 Fred J. Moore, Inc. v. Schinmann, 700 P.2d 754, 756 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985).
129 Keck v.Wacker, 413 F.Supp. 1377, 1381 (E.D. Ky. 1976).
130 A.J. Cunningham Packing Corp. v. Florence Beef Co., 785 F.2d 348, 349 (1st Cir. 1986).
131 Ind. Farm Bureau Coop. Ass’n, v. S.S. Sovereign Faylenne, 24 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (West) 74, 78 
(S.D.N.Y. 1977).
132 Morgan v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 663 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983).
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recognize that firm conclusions about ex ante specification cost savings 
cannot be made solely on the basis of ex post data. It is possible that in the 
absence of the strategy, transactors would have chosen to spell out the 
meaning of the clause at issue under a variety of conditions other than the 
one that arose in the particular case, and would also have elected to include 
detailed definitions of numerous other terms as well, thereby increasing 
specification costs.
The small number of cases involving gap filling and the absence of 
cases involving the interpretation of standard-like provisions might also be 
viewed as an indication that the incorporation strategy is functioning 
extraordinarily well. It might be enabling transactors to avoid litigation by 
encouraging them to look to usages to cooperatively fill gaps and/or give 
meaning to any under-specified provisions in their agreements.133 This 
explanation, however, is hard to reconcile with the large number of cases 
where parties argue about the existence, content, and admissibility of 
usages that are alleged to be relevant to interpreting industry quality 
specifications like “healthy, high-quality SEW pigs”134 or industry short­
hand terms relating to core terms of the contract. That is, to believe that the 
shadow effect of the strategy were working so perfectly, it would be 
necessary to explain why the usage-based meaning of written trade terms is 
less clear to the parties than the usage-based meaning of similar types of 
terms that are not written down.
2. Specification Costs and the Code’s Hierarchy o f Authority.—The 
debate over incorporation has long focused on the specification cost 
savings the strategy might create; yet it has overlooked the possibility that 
in light of the ways courts have implemented the Code’s hierarchy of 
authority and the relatively thin evidence required to establish a usage, the 
strategy might actually increase specification costs.
When transactors want to control the meaning of their contract 
through express terms and are drafting in the shadow of the incorporation 
strategy as it operates in practice, they will need to include additional detail 
and/or additional provisions to fortify their contract’s terms against usage- 
based interpretation. As a leading form-book explains, to ensure usages
133 In addition, the situations in which usages are most likely to exist—when transactors deal with 
one another on a repeat basis or within a well-defined market where most participants are buyers one 
day and sellers the next—are also the situations in which transactors who want to continue to do 
business with one another in the future are likely to work out any rough edges in their relationship in a 
cooperative manner. As a consequence, they might well fill gaps and give meaning to standard-like 
provisions without recourse to court (or, for that matter, usages) regardless of the interpretive approach 
that a court would apply.
134 Trumm v. Feeder’s Supply, Inc., 49 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 44, 46 (Iowa Ct. App. 2002).
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cannot be used to interpret a contract, the contract should include a 
provision specifically setting out, negating, and replacing each usage-based 
interpretation that the transactors wish to exclude.135
A simple example based on elements of decided cases can be used to 
get a feel for the specification costs that might be required to fortify even a 
simple transaction against incorporationist interpretation. Consider a 
contract for the sale of 200 tons of fertilizer with a 22% nitrogen content to 
be delivered FOB to seller’s place of business on March 1 for a price of 
$X. Suppose that the price of fertilizer rose after the contract was signed, 
and the seller delivered 180 tons of fertilizer with a 16% nitrogen content 
on March 7. If the buyer sued for breach of contract and these facts were 
undisputed, he might nevertheless be unable to prevail on either a motion 
for summary judgment or at trial. The seller could claim there was a usage 
that quantities were mere estimates,136 or that any quantity within 20 tons of 
the promised amount was considered good tender per a trade usage. The 
seller might also claim that although the contract called for 22% nitrogen 
content, there was a usage that any nitrogen percentage within 8% of the 
promised amount was considered good tender.137 The seller could also 
assert that the delivery dates were mere estimates or any of a number of 
other usages under which its late delivery would be considered acceptable. 
The seller might also claim either that the buyer was in breach as he failed 
to add sales tax to his payment,138 or that the time for cure should be 
extended because the usages outlined above made it reasonable for him to 
conclude that the nonconforming fertilizer would be accepted with a price 
adjustment. Conversely, the buyer too could potentially make a number of 
usage-based claims. If the price of fertilizer fell, the buyer might reject a 
portion of the delivery, claiming that the 200-ton number was merely an 
estimate or an upper bound.139 She might also claim that the stated price 
was merely an estimate. As a consequence, to ensure that this simple 
agreement would be given its plain meaning, it would have to include 
provisions reciting and negating all of the above-mentioned usages as well
135 See Quinn, supra note 28, Form 4, at 1-28 (providing template clause for opting out of a trade 
usage).
136 See Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971); Heggblade- 
Marguleas-Tenneco, Inc. v. Sunshine Biscuit, Inc., 131 Cal. Rptr. 183 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (where a 
contract was for delivery of a fixed number of bushels of potatoes, the court interpreted it as being a 
contract for an estimated number of potatoes due to a usage of the potato processing industry).
137 Modine Mfg. Co. v. Ne. Indep. Sch. Dist., 503 S.W.2d 833, 837 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) (where 
the contract provided that the cooling capacity of an air conditioner “shall not be less than indicated,” 
the court said a usage that 6% variation in cooling capacity was admissible as it did not contradict the 
contract).
138 See Conf 1 Eagle Corp. v. Tanner & Co. Ginning, 663 So. 2d 204 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
139 See Michael Schiavone & Sons, Inc. v. Securalloy Co., 312 F. Supp. 801 (D. Conn. 1970).
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as all of the usages that either of the transactors might be able to plausibly 
assert in the event of a dispute.
In sum, while incorporationists claim that parties do not have to take 
steps to protect their writings,140 given how courts define “conflict” and the 
relatively thin evidence that is required to establish a usage, transactors 
who want their contracts to be enforced as written may have to incur 
significant specification costs to fortify their contract provisions. The need 
to incur these costs is likely to have particularly undesirable effects on 
contractual innovation. Transactors who want to change common 
contractual provisions, usage-based understandings, or commonly used 
contractual structures will have to incur greater costs to do so than they 
would in a regime that enforced contracts as written. The effects on 
incremental contractual innovation may be especially large. When courts 
are faced with a new clause that slightly changes an old term and a 
demonstrated usage reflecting the old term, they are likely to interpret the 
new term giving weight to the usage, creating a regression to the usage 
effect that may well retard the gradual evolution of value-creating contract 
provisions.141
3. Specification Costs in the Modern Economy.—Even if the 
incorporation strategy influenced transactors’ drafting decisions in the way 
that incorporationists theorize, its effect on the content of commercial 
contracts might be much weaker than they anticipate. This is particularly 
true in contexts where transactors are not part of close-knit, geographically 
concentrated commercial communities or are large entities engaged in 
multiple business contracts.
In contexts where transactors do not know one another well and are 
not part of a geographically localized or well-organized market, they are 
unlikely to know whether a potential contracting partner shares their 
understanding of trade usages. In the absence of such information,
140 See Hillman, supra note 44, at 1157.
141 In defending the merits of the Code, Karl Llewellyn suggested that over time, as courts found 
usages to exist and identified their content, tailored sets of industry-specific default rules would emerge 
and would provide transactors with a set of stock terms on which they could rely, thereby reducing the 
costs of contracting. Robert E. Scott, The Rise and Fall o f Article 2, 62 La . L. Rev. 1009 (2002). Had 
this occurred, it might have provided an additional reason to favor incorporation; yet it might also have 
led to the encrustation of usages, which would itself lead to inefficiency. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. 
Scott, The Limits o f Expanded Choice: An Analysis o f the Interactions Between Express and Implied 
Contract Terms, 73 CALIF. L. Rev. 261, 288—89 (1985). Yet no such industry-specific sets of terms 
have emerged from courts’ trade usage rulings; it is quite uncommon for courts to refer to the content of 
a usage established in another case. This might be because usages are not consistent from place-to-place 
and change too much over time. Or it could be merely that state and federal courts do not issue enough 
published opinions after trials. Whatever the reason, the fact remains that industry-specific sets of stock 
rules have not emerged, forcing most parties to litigate the meaning of particular usages anew in each 
case.
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transactors will have to either bear the cost of investigating their putative 
contracting partner’s understanding of the scope and meaning of the usages 
in the relevant market or will need to memorialize more aspects of their 
deal in writing. In any given transaction it is difficult to predict whether the 
cost of investigation or the cost of drafting a more detailed contract will be 
higher. But the cost of investigation will have to be borne every time a new 
contracting partner is chosen—and, unlike drafting, will not make disputes 
more amenable to resolution on a motion for summary judgment—whereas 
the cost of drafting provisions reflecting the relevant usages must be borne 
only once. Thereafter, the provisions can be used in subsequent 
transactions at little or no cost. Transactors, particularly those who enter 
into many contracts for the purchase or sale of a particular good or set of 
goods, may therefore find it advantageous to incur the one-time cost of 
memorializing usages in contract provisions—which they will implicitly 
prorate over all the future contracts in which they anticipate their use— 
rather than incurring the significant costs of investigating the usage-related 
knowledge of all of their future contracting partners.
The benefits of memorializing any usage-based understandings they 
want to include in their agreements, while including clauses that attempt to 
negate any usages that are not explicitly mentioned, may be particularly 
large for transactors who sell their goods on click-to-buy websites. 142 In 
these situations, sellers typically do not know the identity, location, or 
business of their putative buyers, making it especially important to specify 
all parameters of the deal in advance. Indeed, language attempting to 
exclude usages is very common in the boilerplate of click-to-buy websites, 
both those that market directly to consumers and those that market 
primarily to other businesses. 143
Similar considerations may affect the drafting choices of large 
manufacturing concerns that outsource the production of many components 
of the goods they produce. These companies typically use one standard 
master agreement or a standard set of terms and conditions that is posted on 
their supplier portal for the vast majority of their supply contracts. 144 The 
suppliers they deal with are located around the world and the types of 
transactions they enter into involve numerous discrete markets. In these 
transactions, the cost to buyers of learning the usages in all of their
142 Although no data is available on how often click-to-buy websites include provisions in their 
standard terms of use that opt out of usage, such provisions are far from uncommon.
143 See, e.g., General Terms and Conditions, MINIATURE GARDEN SHOPPE, http://www.miniature 
gardenshoppe.com/termsandconditions.html [http://perma.cc/K2E8-N4T8] (“This agreement may not 
be explained or supplemented by any prior course of dealings or trade by custom or usage.”).
144 See Bernstein, supra note 102.
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suppliers’ markets would be prohibitively high. Even if these usages were 
widely known, the cost to buyer-firms of adjusting their operations to the 
usages of multiple individual markets would eliminate many of the cost 
savings associated with the adoption of standardized internal operating 
procedures. This may be why the master agreements adopted by these firms 
typically contain broad “entire agreement” clauses145—clauses that contract 
managers view as “productive in supporting successful relationships”146— 
as well as many additional provisions that attempt to limit or opt out of the 
Code’s contextualist and incorporationist jurisprudence. 147 The steps that 
large multi-agent firms take to originate and operationalize their contracts 
suggest there are several additional reasons finns are unlikely to take 
advantage of the potential specification cost savings the incorporation 
strategy might afford them.
In large multi-divisional firms the department in the buyer finn that 
needs the goods typically provides the purchasing department with a 
detailed set of written specifications that describe the item to be purchased, 
the range of acceptable quality parameters, required delivery dates, and the 
quantity or range of quantities needed. This information is then used by the 
procurement department to both determine which suppliers are eligible to 
bid for the contract and to draft the bid solicitation documents. When the 
deal is finalized these specifications are simply included in or annexed to
145 See, e.g., Terms and Conditions o f Sale, Alpha & Omega SEMICONDUCTOR cl. 12(e), 
http://www.aosmd.com/terms_and_conditions_of_sale [http://perma.cc/8SSV-2WSD] (“No course of 
dealing in prior transactions between the parties and no usage of trade shall be relevant to supplement or 
explain any term or provision of these Terms and Conditions of Sale.”); Terms and Conditions o f Sale, 
Philips Lighting USA, http://www.usa.lighting.philips.com/connect/termsandconditions/professional. 
wpd [http://perma.cc/YF45-YCQB] (“Course of performance or usage of trade shall not be applied to 
modify these Terms and Conditions.”); Standard Terms and Conditions o f Sale, Infra-Metals cl. 1, 
http://www.infra-metals.com/standard-terms-conditions-sale/ [http://perma.cc/4UWQ-9V3U] (“No 
course or pattern of dealings or conduct between Seller and Customer and no usage of trade shall be 
relevant to determine the meaning or intent of these Terms and Conditions.”).
146 See Tim Cummins, IACCM, 2012 Top Terms in Negotiation (2012) 9-11, 
http://negotiatormagazine.com/docs/cummins_201302184.pdf [http://perma.cc/8T27-S39H].
147 For examples of these provisions, see Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Modem Economy, in 
Philosophical Foundations of Contract Law 238 (Gregory [Class, George Letsas & Prince Saprai 
eds., 2014) (noting that these provisions (some of whose enforceability under the Code is far from 
clear) include “clauses making clear that no courses of dealing, courses of performance, actions, 
inactions or trade usages, are to be construed as waivers or modifications of the agreement’s written 
terms; provisions negating the applicability of usages and industry standards to interpretation of the 
contract; provisions making clear that any terms in purchase orders or commitments made (either orally 
or in writing) during the life of the parties’ contracting relationship are unenforceable unless 
memorialized in a signed amendment to the Master Agreement; and . . .  a variety of merger, integration, 
and entire agreement clauses that are not mere boilerplate but rather vary considerably in their 
specificity and seek to exclude from consideration not only pre-contractual considerations, but some 
post-contract ones as well,” as well as a wide variety of clauses that seek to ensure exact conformity 
with the contracts quality, quantity, and delivery specifications, regardless of industry practices 
(footnotes omitted)).
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the contract with no additional specification costs, making it unlikely a firm 
would opt to omit them.
Moreover, taking into consideration the post-formation writings and 
information sharing activities undertaken by these firms to operationalize 
their contracts—on both the buyer and seller side—suggests that relying on 
usages is unlikely to produce a meaningful reduction in deal-rated 
specification costs. When these firms enter into contracts, the team that 
negotiates them must hand them off to the team that will implement them. 
This process usually involves a half-day of meetings as well as the 
preparation of a detailed contract summary form that captures all relevant 
operational and financial aspects of the deal. 148 To the extent that usages or 
other aspects of the negotiating or contracting context inform the meaning 
of, or add provisions to, these agreements, they will have to be 
memorialized in writing in these hand-off documents. As a consequence, 
firms anticipating these costs are likely to choose to memorialize them in 
their contracts, since the marginal cost of doing so is small, and doing so 
will enable them to both reduce uncertainty and increase the likelihood that 
any disputes reaching a court can be resolved on summary judgment. 
Together, the ex ante sunk costs of the writings produced as part of the 
procurement process and the ex post writings needed to operationalize 
complex contracts make it unlikely that these types of large commercial 
transactors will chose to omit these terms. They are therefore unlikely to 
realize any meaningful specification costs savings from the availability of 
the incorporation strategy.
Moreover, large firms sometimes go to great lengths to educate their 
suppliers about the meanings of their written contracts and the many 
ancillary documents that are incorporated into them. These activities
148 See, e.g., LACCM, Contract Briefing Template (July 2011) (on file with the Northwestern 
University Lew Review) (discussing the handoff process and noting that the summary should include: 
“Goals of the Customer (summarise the outcomes sought from this deal). . .  Goals of supplier 
(summarise the outcomes sought from this deal). . . Scope — (what is in, anything specific that is out 
(but could be a source of confusion)). .. Beneficiaries (ie who is eligible to participate).. . 
Performance measures / KPIs (including any specific obligations re: on-going price reductions, 
performance improvements). . . Consequences of non-performance (in particular areas such as 
LDs). . .  Change procedures (and major sources of anticipated change).. . Review, reporting, 
communication procedures (internal and external).. . Responsibilities of Customer [including contract 
page number, name of lead person, and date for performance]. . . Responsibilities of the Supplier..  . 
Active Terms [including page number, lead person, and date for performance] . . . Milestones 
[same] . , . Time-bound activities and responsibilities [same] . . . Risks (noted during bid and 
negotiation phase [including ‘mitigation/management/allocation assumed when contract signed’] . . . 
Opportunities noted during bid and negotiation phase [and designations for follow through] .. . Useful 
information discovered concerning customer/supplier organisation and personalities, relevant to 
managing the contract. . . Governance Requirements [including manager names and committee 
names] , .. Other relevant information we already obtained that will help with interpretation of the 
contract (e.g. Legal Advice taken on key points). . . [and] Subcontract details”).
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suggest that firms are not confident in their contracting partners’ ability to 
understand even the written and explicit aspects of the deal. Caterpillar, for 
example, runs a Supplier Development College, which has courses on 
many subjects including one on “Understanding Purchasing Orders Terms 
and Conditions.”149 Similarly, John Deere has webinars to explain the core 
aspects of its Supplier Quality Manual, an eighty-eight-page document that 
is incorporated into all of its supplier contracts.150
Finally, it is important to note that the incorporation strategy is also 
said to be disadvantageous for another type of contract that is increasingly 
important to the American economy: contracts for innovation, which 
govern highly collaborative, often tentative relationships that involve 
“iterative collaboration between firms.”151 In such contexts, the 
incorporation of usages is said to be quite undesirable, as “trade usage, 
which use[s] wider industry norms to interpret the meaning of a contract, 
will likely lead the court astray since collaborators are often actively trying 
to forsake industry conventions as they innovate.”152
4. Conclusion.—In sum, although the study did not yield any 
definitive conclusions about the strategy’s effect on specification costs, its 
findings about the likely magnitude of interpretive error costs strongly 
suggest that specification costs are likely to increase as well. Although 
incorporationists maintain that the desirability of the strategy turns on a 
comparison of these two categories of costs, and have concluded that 
“incorporation reduces specification costs significantly more than it 
increases error and administrative costs,”153 they have failed to realize that 
interpretive error costs and specification costs are actually interrelated in a 
dynamic way. As interpretive error costs increase, transactors who want to 
control the meaning of their contracts will need to enter into even more
149 Caterpillar Supplier Dev. C., https://supplierconnect.cat.com/wps/portal/catconnect/SDC 
[https://perma.cc/7P22-LTR8].
150 John Deere Supply Network, JDS-G223 Supplier Quality Manual (Mar. 12, 2009) (on file with 
the Northwestern University Law Review). See also John Deere Supply Network, JDS-G223 Supplier 
Quality Manual Overview Training Presentation (Jan. 2015), https://jdsn.deere.com/wps/wcm/connect/ 
dbac790046eeace29093fae206e2b4ca/JDS-G223_Training_Presentation.pdf?MOD=AJPERES [http:// 
perma.cc/D8DQ-W82W]. It is important to note that some of the obligations explained in the John 
Deere manual may well reflect industry-wide written usages—most buyers require their suppliers to 
comply with ISO standards and many of the requirements of the Deere manual are restatements of these 
obligations—yet Deere still chooses to write them down even though they are codified elsewhere.
151 Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Contracting for Innovation: Vertical 
Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 435 (2009); see also Matthew C. 
Jennejohn, Contract Adjudication in a Collaborative Economy, 5 Va. L. &BUS. Rev. 173, 179 (2010).
152 Jennejohn, supra note 151, at 179. For a more complete discussion and analysis of the 
contracting practices of John Deere and similar companies, see Bernstein, supra note 102.
153 See Walt, supra note 7, at 263.
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detailed and specific contracts in an effort to fortify the terms of their 
contracts and thereby constrain the range of meanings a court might 
attribute to their agreement—thereby incurring higher specification costs.
IV. Reforming Commercial Law
A. The Argument for Large Scale Legal Reform
In response to the problems created by the incorporation strategy and 
other aspects of the Code’s highly contextualized and quasi-mandatory 
approach to adjudication, neo-formalist scholars' 54 suggest replacing the 
Code’s interpretive approach (at least in transactions between businesses) 
with a rule that makes a formalist/agreement-centric approach to 
interpretation the default, but that also leaves transactors free to contract ex 
ante for a more contextualized interpretation of either their contract as a 
whole or of some of its provisions. 155 They explain that such a change 
would reflect the preferences of a majority of business transactors, and 
transform the Code’s current quasi-mandatory interpretive approach into 
the type of majoritarian default rule the law generally favors. 156
The shift to a more formalist interpretive default rule would arguably 
give transactors a way to largely avoid some of the most significant costs 
associated with the incorporation strategy. It would enable transactors to 
draft contracts that would be more amenable to summary judgment-based 
adjudication, permit businesses to select adjudication on a truncated 
evidentiary base, 157 and reduce the internal firm information-transmittal and 
contract-administration costs occasioned by the strategy. In addition, if 
combined with a change that also permitted the parties to opt out of the 
incorporation strategy in its entirety—including its course of dealing and 
course of performance components—a more formalist default rule would
154 Avery Wiener Katz, The Economics o f Form and Substance in Contract Interpretation, 
104 COLUM. L. REV. 496, 503 (2004) (identifying Robert Scott, Alan Schwartz, and Lisa Bernstein as 
leading neo-formalists).
155 Alan Schwartz & Robert E . Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits o f Contract Law, 113 YALE 
L.J. 541 (2003); Bernstein, supra note 147, at 251-53 (demonstrating that supply contracts entered into 
by Big Box retailers and other firms with highly outsourced production processes often include 
numerous provisions attempting to opt out of the Code’s incorporationist jurisprudence).
156 See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 155. Alternatively, such a rule could also be structured to 
permit parties to elect incorporationist adjudication only if they also designated an industry expert 
arbitrator or arbitration panel to make binding determinations about the content of usages. It might also 
be designed to impose additional requirements that would have desirable information forcing effects 
and largely eliminate commonly litigated issues. It might for example, require parties electing 
incorporation to stipulate that they are both merchants and to specify the industry and location whose 
usages are to govern their transaction.
157 Transactors would likely desire this in many transactional contexts. See id. at 583-84.
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both reduce the intra-firm agency costs created by the strategy158 and enable 
transactors to more fully capture the benefits of using a two-tiered 
contractual structure consisting of both legal and extra-legal terms. 
Moreover, as discussed further below, such a shift in default rules would be 
likely to significantly reduce, though not entirely eliminate, transactors’ 
ability to engage in “private language”-based strategic behavior in which a 
transactor who is disadvantaged by a contract’s plain meaning, argues ex 
post that the contract was actually written in a “private language” 
consisting of usage-based meanings that favor his legal position. 159 Finally, 
such a change would also increase the returns to careful drafting, which 
would in turn encourage contractual innovation, decrease the social cost of 
disputing meaning (as fewer disputes reach the legal system), and increase 
contractual clarity which would in turn facilitate the creation and 
maintenance of cooperative contracting relationships.
B. Reducing Strategic Behavior Costs
The adoption of the neo-formalists’ proposed interpretive default 
would most likely reduce the incidence of private language-related strategic 
behavior. Yet it is unlikely to do so as successfully as some of its 
proponents have suggested.
Under the proposed rule, when transactors accept the formalistic 
default, their ability to claim that their contract should be interpreted in a 
particular way because it was written in a “private language” will be 
constrained. However, parties often seek to introduce usage evidence by 
framing their usage-based arguments as a claim that the usage creates an 
“additional term,” or a precondition to the invocation of a clear written 
term, rather than as a factor to be taken into account in interpretation. As a
158 Bernstein, supra note 147 (explaining that the Code’s course of performance and course of 
dealing provisions make it necessary for firms to put controls on the flow of information within the finn 
and the actions of their employees that are expensive to implement and may prevent or discourage their 
employees from making value creating flexible adjustments to contracts).
159 Schwartz & Scott, supra note 155, at 584-90. The study of usage in the courts confirmed that 
transactors do, in fact, make these types of private language claims, and that courts are inclined to 
permit usage-based private language meanings to trump even seemingly contradictory express terms. 
However, the study was unable to draw any conclusions about the frequency of strategic behavior. First, 
there were only six reported cases that involved a trial on a plain meaning versus usage-based meaning. 
Second, it is actually quite difficult to determine whether or not the claims made in these cases were in 
fact strategic. Private language based claims might reflect strategic behavior, but might also simply 
reflect a party’s good faith attempt to demonstrate the parties’ true intent at the time of contracting. 
Alternatively even if private language based claims do not involve a party being strategic in the sense of 
asserting the existence of a nonexistent usage in attempt to override plain meaning, they may well 
involve a transactor falsely arguing that a practice that transactors opt to follow on an occurrence-by- 
occurrence basis must actually be followed all of the time, or that a usage that exists under certain 
market conditions (such as stable prices) should be applied in a situation where conditions are very 
different (such as a time of price volatility).
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consequence, in order for the proposed formalist default to be effective, it 
would have to be combined with the adoption of both a strong parol 
evidence rule that treats usage as parol and a rule giving strict effect to 
integration clauses.
Some proponents of the proposed rule suggest that it will also 
significantly reduce strategic behavior even when contextual adjudication 
is selected. 160 They reason that a party selecting a contextualist default will 
only be able to play a language game by claiming that the plain meaning of 
the contract trumps the alleged contextual meaning, something that will 
occur infrequently and only by happenstance. In practice, however, given 
the low evidentiary threshold for establishing a usage, it remains likely that 
a party seeking to establish a usage-based meaning favorable to his 
position, will be able to find an employee willing to testify to any of a wide 
range of favorable meanings, thus reintroducing the prospect of strategic 
behavior. 161
Even if employees were not inclined to lie or shade the truth for their 
employers, there is nonetheless likely to be significant play in the range of 
plausible (and perhaps even truthful) usage-based meanings of particular 
terms. First, it is nowise clear that transactors understand what a usage is, 
even when it is explained to them by a lawyer, a court, or a survey 
researcher. Many of the witnesses who testified in the usage cases referred 
to “my usage” or the “usage of my firm,” rather than “the usage,” a 
distinction courts did not detect. In addition, when transactors in the Texas 
grain industry were asked to give examples of usages, their answers tended 
to be either vague invocations of “old boy” norms like “my word is my 
bond,” or references to practices that were actually memorialized in the 
written documents governing their deals. 162 Second, studies of the existence
160 Schwartz & Scott, supra note 155, at 585-86 (suggesting that the change in default rule will 
markedly reduce strategic behavior even when transactors choose contextualism). But see Bernstein, 
supra note 147, at 259-60 (arguing the opposite).
161 See Bernstein, supra note 147, at 259-60.
162 See id. at 246^19. In addition, the sociology of management literature suggests that even within 
a firm, language differences arise across divisions and other types of clusters to such an extent that they 
create “difficulty in moving ideas between groups,” without the aid of individuals (known in the 
literature as “brokers”) who know the language of both groups and can translate between them. See 
Ronald S. Burt, Brokerage and Closure: An Introduction to Social Capital 17 (2005) 
(“Opinions and behaviors within a group are often expressed in a local language, a dialect fraught with 
taken-for-granted assumptions shared within a group. The local language makes it possible for people in 
the group to exchange often-repeated data more quickly.. . [yet] the more specialized the language 
within groups . . .  the greater the difficulty in moving ideas between groups.” (citation omitted)). If 
these language difficulties exist within the divisions of a single firm, they are also likely exist (and, 
perhaps, to be even more extensive) between firms. This suggests that there is reason to question the 
idea that words have industry-wide tacit meanings as well as the idea that two firms—especially ones 
that have not dealt with one another for a long period of time—are likely to enter into a contract with a 
shared set of tacit understandings of language even if they are in the same industry. See also Bernstein,
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and content of trade usages from the Middle Ages163 to the present have 
documented that, to the limited extent that trade usages exist at all, they 
tend to be far less precise and far more local in scope than either the Code 
or incorporationists typically assume—making the range of usages that can 
be plausibly asserted extraordinarily broad in most transactional contexts. 164 
As Llewellyn himself acknowledged in the early comments to a draft of the 
Code, “[U]sage may be unclear, or in the process of change, or different as 
between the market the seller knows and the market familiar to the 
buyer. ” 165 Thus, with the exception of situations where the private language 
at issue is codified in a written set of rules—such as the Incoterms, 166 or the 
Worth Street Textile Rules167—when parties opt for contextualism, the 
likelihood of strategic behavior is likely to be either slightly reduced or 
essentially unchanged from what it is under the current approach.
C. The Limited Evidence on Majoritarian Preferences
The assumption that transactors want their contracts to be given a 
usage-based and highly contextual meaning is deeply woven into the Code; 
yet there is no empirical evidence that business transactors actually prefer 
contextualist adjudication. Indeed, the limited available empirical evidence 
suggests that certain types of merchants and many business entities actually 
prefer more formalist approaches to adjudication.
Studies of dispute resolution in merchant industries (particularly cash 
commodities markets) suggest that merchants strongly prefer formalist
supra note 102 (noting that Harley Davidson produces a glossary of Harley-specific abbreviations for 
the use of its suppliers).
163 Emily Kadens, The Myth o f the Customary Law Merchant, 90 Tex . L. Rev . 1153, 1177 (2012) 
[hereinafter Kadens, Myth] (suggesting that there were not widely known usages of trade relating to 
sales transactions during the Middle Ages and that such usages as existed were highly local); Emily 
Kadens, The Medieval Law Merchant: The Tyranny o f a Construct, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS (forthcoming 
2015), http://jla.oxfordjoumals.org/content/early/2015/06/25/jla.lav004.full.pdf+html [http://perma.cc/ 
GAT7-VQ8Z] [hereinafter Kadens, Medieval Law Merchant].
164 For a summary of these studies, see Kadens, Myth, supra note 163 and Kadens, Medieval Law 
Merchant, supra note 163.
165 Revised Uniform Sales Act, supra note 2, at 52 (Comment to § l-C).
166 The Incoterms are a codified set of rules dealing with the shipment and transport o f goods in 
international commerce. They are promulgated by the International Chamber of Commerce and are 
revised every few years. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, INCOTERMS 2010, 
http://www.iccwbo.org [http://perma.ee/YSC9-ZR4L],
167 The Worth Street Textile Rules are a set of trading rules that are used to resolve disputes under 
the textile industry’s private arbitration rules that are administered by the American Arbitration 
Association. The Worth Street Rules cover most of the same subjects as the UCC, and include a 
standard form sales note and several compilations of industry customs for different branches of the 
trade. For a discussion of the genesis of these rules, see Bernstein, Questionable Empirical Basis, supra 
note 101, at 730-35.
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interpretation. 168 In many of these markets, contracts are governed by 
industry-drafted trade rules and are interpreted and enforced in trade- 
association-run arbitration tribunals. Although the tribunals are staffed by 
industry-expert arbitrators who would be expected to be well versed in any 
extant trade usages, the tribunals nonetheless adopt formalistic adjudicative 
approaches. They do not look to courses of performance and courses of 
dealing to interpret contracts and only look to usage if the parties’ contract, 
the relevant association’s trade rules, and the UCC are all silent on a 
particular question—that is, in the case of a true contractual gap.
The best available systematic evidence about the interpretive 
preferences of large corporate transactors suggests that they too prefer 
formalistic adjudication. A recent study of choice of law provisions in large 
commercial contracts169 found that transactors preferred to be governed by 
relatively formalist/agreement-centric New York law than by relatively 
contextualist California law. The study concluded that “[t]he testimony of 
the marketplace—the verdict of thousands of sophisticated parties whose 
incentives are to maximize the value of contract terms—is that New York’s 
formalistic rules win out over California’s contextualist approach. ” 170 
Similar preferences were revealed by a European study that looked at 
choice of law provisions in business contracts subject to arbitration at the 
International Chamber of Commerce. It found that transactors strongly 
favored British law, the most fonnalistic of the available EU alternatives. 171
More generally, it is important to note that large businesses entering 
into many types of contracts—including executive employment 
agreements, 172 consulting agreements, 173 large retailer supply contracts, 174
168 See Bernstein, supra note 1 (describing the formalistic adjudicative approach used in the grain 
and feed industry’s private arbitration system); Bernstein, Creating Cooperation, supra note 62 
(describing the fonnalistic adjudicative approach used in the cotton industry’s arbitration system).
169 Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to New York: An Empirical Study o f 
Choice o f Law and Choice o f Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies ’ Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. 
Rev. 1475 (2009) (looking at choice of law clauses in large commercial contracts, though not 
exclusively ones for the sale of goods).
170 Geoffrey P. Miller, Bargains Bicoastal: New Light on Contract Theory, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1475, 1478 (2010).
171 See Stuart Popham, Clifford Chance LLP, The View o f European Business: Survey Results
Presentation (Mar. 14, 2008), http://denning.law.ox.ac.uk/news/events_files/Popham_-
_presentation.PPT [http://penna.cc/AHC8-E9UQ].
172 See, e.g., Netsmart Technologies, Inc. & James L. Conway, Employment Agreement cl. 11(e) 
(Aug. 15, 1996) (on file with the Northwestern University Law Review) (“No course of conduct or 
dealing between the parties and no custom or trade usage shall be relied upon to vary the terms of this 
Agreement.”).
173 See, e.g., Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. & Dennis J. Carey, Consulting Agreement cl. 14 (Aug. 14, 
2002) (on file with the Northwestern University Law Review) (“Neither the course of conduct between 
the parties nor trade usage will act to modify or alter the provisions of this Consulting Agreement.”).
174 See Bernstein, supra note 147, at 251-53.
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and the supply contracts of large original equipment manufacturers175— 
sometimes include a variety of provisions that seek to limit the role of 
contextualist interpretation. These include provisions excluding course of 
dealing, course of performance and usage of trade from gap fdling and/or 
interpretation, as well as provisions calling for contracts to be given their 
“plain meaning,” or to be interpreted in accordance with the goals set out in 
their preamble without any expansion of rights or duties. Additional 
examples abound.176
D. Smaller, More Politically Feasible Changes
The best available empirical evidence about the existence of usages, 
the operation of the Code’s trade usage provision, and the preferences of 
business transactors support making more formalist interpretation the 
default approach in transactions among businesses (especially larger 
businesses who receive legal advice). But the history of the American Law 
Institute’s most recent attempt to overhaul Article 2 suggests that at present 
large scale reform of American commercial sales law may be politically 
infeasible, whatever its potential economic benefits. It is therefore useful to 
consider some possible changes in the way that the Code is interpreted— 
some of which are even more consonant with the views of its drafter than 
the approaches courts presently adopt—as well as a number of smaller, and 
perhaps more politically feasible amendments to the Code that might create 
significant benefits.
One way courts could greatly improve the operation of the Code 
would be to give full effect to integration clauses that specifically exclude 
usages of trade, courses of performance, and courses of dealing. This 
would transform the Code’s adjudicative approach from a quasi-mandatory 
rule to something closer to a true default rule. Another would be for courts 
to more strictly enforce the Code’s hierarchy of authority and to adopt a 
more robust definition of “conflict” that would make it more difficult to 
override express terms with usages or alleged usages. Although these 
proposed changes, like the neo-formalist proposal to shift the default rule, 
would not eliminate strategic behavior unless accompanied by significant
175 See Network Engines, Inc. & VA Linux Systems, Inc., Supplier Agreement cl. 20.18 (Mar. 1, 
2000) (on file with the Northwestern University Law Review) (“This Agreement shall not be modified 
and/or amended by any course of dealing, course of performance or trade usage.”); Compaq Computer 
Corp. & Brocade Communications Systems, Inc., Corporate Purchase Agreement cl. 31.6 (Feb. 1, 2000) 
(on file with the Northwestern University Law Review) (“This Agreement.. . shall not be supplemented 
or modified by any course of dealing or trade usage. Variance from or addition to the terms and 
conditions of this Agreement in any Order, or other written notification from Seller will be of no 
effect.”).
176 See Bernstein, supra note 147, at 251-53.
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parol evidence rule reform, such changes might nonetheless greatly 
increase party control over the meaning of their agreements.
Finally, if  commercial law reformers insist on remaining true to 
Llewellyn’s vision, as they did during the latest (failed) attempt to revise 
Article 2, they might consider excluding usages related to the core dickered 
terms of a contract— which in Llewellyn’s view included price, quality, 
quantity, payment terms, and delivery time— while permitting their 
introduction in relation to other issues. As Llewellyn explained in the 
Comments to early drafts of the Code, deference to written terms is based 
on the idea that they reflect “bargains whose detailed terms the two parties 
had looked over,” and when this is true “[i]t requires what the parties’ have 
bargained out to stand as the parties have shaped it, subject only to certain 
overriding rules o f public policy.”177 In contrast, with respect to the non- 
dickered terms, Llewellyn thought that courts should look to “the fair and 
balanced general law and the fair and balanced usage of the particular 
trade,”178 noting that “ [displacement of these balanced backgrounds is not 
to be assumed as intended unless deliberate intent is shown that they shall 
be displaced.”179
Other changes that would improve the operation of the Code would 
require small, yet potentially controversial, amendments to the Code or its 
Official Comments. One potentially significant small change would be to 
amend the comments to § 2-207 to make limitations on consequential 
damages, limitations on warranty, and clauses providing for arbitration 
either per se material or nonmaterial alterations. Issues related to these 
clauses are often litigated and, unlike cases where usages are introduced to 
interpret a contract provision or add an unwritten implicit clause to an 
agreement, the party seeking to exclude the different additional term often 
has the burden of proving that the additional term is not a usage—  
something that is very expensive and difficult to do.
Conclusion
Drawing on a study of the ways that the trade usage component of 
Article 2’s incorporation strategy works in practice rather than in theory, 
this Article has sought to reexamine the desirability of the Uniform 
Commercial Code’s interpretive approach on the terms put forth by its most 
ardent defenders. In doing so it has raised serious questions about the core
177 Revised Uniform Sales Act, supra note 2, at 52-53 (Comment to § 1-C).
178 See Amy H. Kastely, Stock Equipment for the Bargain in Fact: Trade Usage, "Express Terms, ’’ 
and Consistency Under Section 1-205 o f the Uniform Commercial Code, 64 N.C. L. REV. 777, 794 
n.l 10 (1986) (quoting the REVISED UNIFORM SALES ACT, supra note 2, at 53 (Comment to § 1-C)).
179 Revised Uniform Sales Act, supra note 2, at 53 (Comment to § 1 -C).
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defense of the strategy—namely that as compared to a more formalistic 
approach to adjudication, it will decrease specification costs without 
greatly increasing interpretive error costs. This Article has suggested that in 
light of the way courts interpret the Code’s hierarchy of authority, the thin 
evidence needed to establish a usage, and the dynamic relationship between 
interpretive error costs and specification costs, the strategy is likely to raise 
both types of costs, open the door to strategic behavior, constrain 
contractual innovation, and inhibit efficient contracting.
In reaching these conclusions, this Article accepted for the sake of 
argument, that the types of usages the Code seeks to incorporate actually 
exist and that contextualist interpretation was a majoritarian preference. 
Yet in reality the existence of trade usages that are both generally known 
and geographically coextensive with segments of the relevant trade has 
never been demonstrated empirically, nor have business transactors’ 
preferences for highly contextual incorporationist interpretive approaches 
ever been documented. Indeed, the limited empirical evidence available on 
both of these questions cuts strongly against incorporationists’ 
assumptions. Given that the search for usages that likely do not exist will 
increase interpretive error costs and strategic behavior costs without 
producing any offsetting specification cost savings, and that adopting a 
quasi-mandatory contextualist interpretive default (when transactors in fact 
prefer formalistic adjudication) will lead to higher specification costs as 
transactors fortify their contracts in an effort to constrain the range of 
meanings a court might attribute to their contract, the costs of retaining the 
incorporation strategy as a quasi-mandatory default rule may be even 
higher than the analysis presented here has suggested.
In sum, while we may never have perfect data on which to base 
commercial law reform, modem law reformers, in ignoring the best 
empirical data that we do have, have let the perfect be the enemy of the 
good. In so doing they have failed to see that sales law is deeply broken, 
both in its present state and in terms of its ability to repair itself. For while 
Llewellyn sought to create a semi-permanent piece of legislation whose 
structure and interpretive methodology would ensure that it could be 
adapted to “unforeseen and new circumstances and practices” as well as 
other changes in the structure, operation, and organization of trade,180 
Article 2, as interpreted by the courts, has not, in fact, been able to adapt 
itself to the fundamental changes that have taken place in the American 
economy since the time the Code was drafted.181 These changes, together
180 U.C.C. § 1-102(b) cmt. 1 (2001).
181 See Bernstein, supra note 147 (discussing the lack of fit between the rules and jurisprudential 
constructs in Article 2 and the needs of the modern outsourced economy).
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with the ways that the incorporation strategy has been operationalized by 
courts, suggest that whatever the merits of the strategy may have been in 
1940, given its likely effects on specification costs, interpretive error costs, 
and strategic behavior, it cannot be justified as meeting the needs of 
modem commerce today. It is therefore time to adopt a formalist default 
approach to the interpretation of business contracts that will also leave 
transactors free to opt for contextualism. It is only after an interpretive 
default rule that in practice is a pure default has been in operation for a 
significant period of time, that it will be possible to quantitatively assess 
whether contextualism or formalism better reflects majoritarian 
preferences. And, it is only after research establishes that usages of trade 
that are widely known and geographically coextensive with the extent of 
trade both exist and reflect obligations that transactors want courts to 
enforce (as opposed to “informal” or “relationship preserving” norms), that 
it will be possible to conclude that incorporationist contextualism should 
even be one of the available interpretive default options.
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